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Abstract
Phenomenology offers a conceptual framework that connects and strength-
ens the architect’s intuitive understanding of the human experience of space
with the theorist’s more critical approach. Phenomenology is an ideal ve-
hicle for architectural theorists to avoid the friction between first-hand or
subjective experience and generalised or abstracted accounts of experience.
In this thesis I extract an account of the human experience of space that
is implicit in the Philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work.i I consider
how this understanding has been employed in architectural scholarship
and practice. In particular, I argue that the human body renders the rich-
ness of space through deliberate engagement with the indeterminate and
independent possibilities of the world. In other words, as the body in-
tentionally engages with the world, it synthesises objects that create deter-
minate spatial situations. I account for Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of the
body’s non-rule governed, non-reflective, normative directiveness towards
spaces and elements, and label it the thinking body.ii Furthermore I examine
how the philosophical theory of Merleau-Ponty is represented in the ex-
plicitly theoretical works of Juhani Pallasmaa. In turn I then consider how
the thinking body is physically and conceptually realised in the buildings of
Carlo Scarpa.
Finally I find that Juhani Pallasmaa’s description of the phenomenolog-
ical experience of space is incompatible with Merleau-Ponty’s. The strate-
gic importance of these different accounts emerges when projecting their
implications for designed space. Pallasmaa’s account points towards an ar-
chitecture that prioritises sensory experiences synthesised by the mind.iii
The design focus of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy leads to spatial practices
iThis thesis benefits from my study of philosophy at the University of California at
Berkeley, where my understanding of Merleau-Ponty has been inspired and clarified by
Professor Hebert Dreyfus.
iiMerleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge, Taylor and Francis
Group, New York, NY. [110, 138]
iiiAlberto Pe´rez-Go´mez, S. P., editor (2004). Chora: Intervals in the Philosophy of Archi-
tecture. McGill-Queens Press. [158] Pallasmaa, J. (1996). The Eyes of the Skin. Academy
in line with Carlo Scarpa, that are sympathetic to the causal qualities of
an intentional bodily engagement with spatial situations. In accord with
Merleau-Ponty I argue that human body is our medium for the world and
as such creates the spatial situation we engage with from a formless mani-
fold of possibilities.
Karan August
October 2008
Editions. [24]
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0.1 Preface
Down the rabbit hole; where a reading of Gaston Bachelard took me.
It was a reading of Bachelard in the cold of late autumn that changedmy
life. I had just enrolled in undertaking a masters thesis at Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington’s rather contemporary Architecture School. Pleased with
my new vocation, and confident in my theory, I imagined my world within
a few months accompanied by chapters of writing and endless praise. In
the front room of my nineteenth century workers’ cottage (a bay of four
windows, erected in U-shaped and reaching vertically from my knees past
my up-stretched arms) welcomed my reading chair. I tucked myself up in
layers of woolen blankets, scarves and cap. The borer-eaten floor boards,
still strong, permitted icy breezes through the joints which had shifted with
the soil over the century. I began to read Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space, an-
notating feverishly as I progressed.iv I shifted in my chair and pouredmore
tea. But it was not the concepts of Bachelard’s theory that affected me, so
much as the events surrounding the reading.
To go back; I am not naturally endowed with the knack of reading.
Teachers tested and questioned me but what seems now to fall under the
wide umbrella of dyslexia, was never diagnosed as such. When ‘reading’
I draw upon my associations of shapes with sounds or meanings—usually
only the essential meanings of words. Wee words like ‘it’, ‘to’ or ‘is’ are
indistinguishable, but the shapes of the sentences stimulates the contextu-
alising whole. The meaning comes in waves of intensities, at first like a
faint yellow glow from a sunset, deepening to rich oranges and sometimes
burnt reds. At first glance the individual words feel indeterminate, but as
I look the shapes become ‘meanings’ and the context given by the most
familiar of the words, sets the rest in place as I move along the page.
However this is a story about my reading of Bachelard in the cold bay
of windows, looking upon the colourful trees and houses of an old sub-
urban valley. I read The Poetics of Space and my thoughts began to drift.
At Berkeley I studied phenomenology; Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. I
charmed my professors and sat in on graduate seminars, only daring a few
times to speak in heated debates of details, where fists were thumped upon
the solid redwood table. Hence, Bachelard’s casual claims of what a phe-
nomenologist does, began to lose me. I was disenchanted, though I read
on:
iv [Bachelard, 1958, -]
We should therefore have to say how we inhabit our vital space, in
accord with all the dialectics of life, how we take root, day after day, in
a ‘corner of the world.’v
My ‘corner of the world’ seemed cold and fragile, built in a rush to only last
a few years while the initial occupiers tried their luck in this last outpost of
one ‘new world’.
Another habit of mine is to indulge thewandering ofmy thoughts while
reading. I consider it ad hoc meditation. Ad hoc in temporality, for it com-
mences unplanned, however the direction of the meditation is led by the
writer’s ideas on the page. Some of my best ideas of love came to me while
staring at a book of rhetoric. For while the author’s words bounce the play-
ground is controlled by me.
I accepted the The Poetics of Space as a work of art in this sense. One
man’s obsession with space, one man’s experience in memories. Bachelard
opened a world and beckons people to share his experiences. He synthe-
sises his experiences in a collection of words that whirl around a fundamen-
tal idea; ones of the paradoxes of childhood; love for one’s own inquisitive
and contented nature.
I determined that if I was to write a thesis concerning the experience
of architectural space then it followed that I needed a fitting space within
which to write. I saw a structure that was sympathetic to my existing house
just more solid, warm and scaled to my reach; a ladder that presented chal-
lenges as I responded to its beckoning to ascend, doors that opened upon a
gentle pull with handles that invited my palms. It was something simple,
but ‘honest’ in its materiality — the beams seen are the beams that carry
the gable, the floor walked on, is rock siting on the rock in the ground, the
heat felt comes from the fire smelled and seen, and the colours move about
the space from the sun’s exchange with the glass.
It is all very well to have a fantasy of a perfect space and then get on and
write. But I drew and I talked, and a month later I was turning in my forms
to the city’s planning department, and making deals with builders. The
deals with builders were what wrecked me. The plans looked simple, but
the details were particular: the space was made by the details. Given that I
had never built before slight differences in understanding between myself,
the builder and the people on site escaped my attention. I stumbled on.
It was a morning in spring when I stood in my old kitchen, shades
v [Bachelard, 1958, 4]
drawn, watching aman in the gardenwith a shovel. I realised the strangeness
of my situation. My partner, whom I had lived within two previous coun-
tries, had tired of my fixation with creating ‘space’ (among, I’m sure, other
things). Delays and bureaucracy, set up in hopes of catching cheap de-
velopers, tangled my unsavvy steps. The unfamiliar tradesman across the
kitchen bench asked if I was Christian. In an attempt to be polite, I replied
that I had grown up such. He asked me, “can I pray for you?” Unnerved, I
answered “yes”. Still, not expecting his hand to jut across the bench, on to
my forehead and loud cries of “The Lord” to plea for my soul. I remained
still.
As I write, I sit at my desk, in the space I ‘created’. The sun is sinking
into the hillside, the sky is pastels (remarkably so) and the pinks fill the
wooden ceiling with warmth. The fire is lit, the stone is warm on my feet,
herbs dry above my desk. The trees outside my window are growing back.
It is now that I compose my thoughts.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The fact that the Modernist idiom has not been able to penetrate the
surface of popular taste and values is due to its one-sided visual em-
phasis; Modernist design has housed the intellect and the eye, but it
has left the body and the other senses, as well as our memories and
dreams, homeless.1
It is commonly assumed that we are best served by our tactic environ-
ment when we scarcely notice its presence. If the skin is indeed know-
ing, standard Western interior design does not often give it much to
think about.2
‘Natural geometry’ or ‘natural judgement’ are myths in the Platonic
sense, intended to represent the envelopment or ‘implication’ of a sig-
nificance in signs, neither signs nor significance being yet posited and
explicitly contained in thought, and this is what we must elucidate by
returning to perceptual experience.3
1.1 The problem
This section uses a tripartite structure in which I offer a critique of contem-
porary architecture. I initially survey architectural theory to support the
1 [Pallasmaa, 1996, 10]
2 [Classen, 2005, 29]
3 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 257]
1
claim that contemporary architecture fails to adequately engage with the
human body. I regard this lack as due to a failing to understand the intellec-
tual faculties of the body. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s research about the
thinking body offers architecture a constructive method for considering the
body. Furthermore, I outline my critique of how Merleau-Ponty’s thought
has been adopted by an architectural theorist. Specifically I suggest that the
predominate solutions offered by the discipline lie within a superficial un-
derstanding of the phenomena of the human experience of space, leading
to an architectural theory promoting the manifold of the senses. Overall,
this chapter establishes a ‘want’ in architecture and sets out how I respond.
1.1.1 Accounting for the lack
Contemporary architecture often falls short of creating environments that
offer a richness of experiences that cater to the capacities of the human
body. Various architectural theorists critique architecture’s disinterest in
the body.4 Those surveyed in this section each propose a two-part argu-
ment. The first proposition is that geometrical or visual elements dominate
architectural spaces and the second is that architecture ought to consider
experiential space. This study supports the claim that architecture lacks
adequate engagement with the human body.
Christian Norberg-Schulz opened the phenomenologically inspired ar-
chitectual critiques with his 1971 work, Existence, Space and Architecture.5 In
it he maintains that, “studies of geometry or visual perception only grasp
relatively superficial aspects of the problem”.6 He continues to state that
architectural spaces ought to be about a more experiential space.7 More
recently Juhani Pallasmaa, in The Eyes of the Skin, suggests that an archi-
tectural climate of visual dominance has failed in creating spaces that ad-
equately engage the human body.8 In his words, the “ocular bias and the
visual hegemony in the art of architecture have never been more apparent
4 [Norberg-Schulz, 1971, 16], [Pallasmaa, 1996, 19], [Pe´rez-Go´mez and Parcell, 2004, 31],
[Gregotti, 1996, 99], [Grosz, 2001, 14], [Imrie, 2003, 58]
5 [Norberg-Schulz, 1971, -]
6 [Norberg-Schulz, 1971, 16]
7 [Norberg-Schulz, 1971, 16]
8Juhani Pallasmaa’s career ranges from practitioner, lecturer, writer to theorist. He
trained in the technical field of architecture in the mid-1950s and began publishing essays in
the late 1960s [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 11]. In the 1970s, a trip to Ethiopia “disillusioned” Pallas-
maa’s “faith and confidence in rationality” [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 17]. He has since examined
other fields to provide support for a new architectural theory [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 18]. His
1996 book, The Eyes of the Skin established Pallasmaa as a leading Architectural theorist of
Merleau-Ponty.
2
than in the past thirty years”9 He claims that this bias has created spaces
that utilise the rhetorical tools of advertising to persuade the user immedi-
ately at the cost of flexibility and richness of an embodied experience.10 A
central thread of Pallasmaa’s later work is that the architecture of industrial
man is flawed due to a ‘retinal infatuation’ and a disregard for the haptic
encounter.11 In a 2005 article he writes:
Our current obsession with the seductive visual image in all areas of
contemporary life, promotes a retinal architecture, which is deliber-
ately conceived to be circulated and appreciated as instant and strik-
ing photographed images, rather than being experienced slowly in an
embodied manner through a physical and full spatial encounter.12
Pallasmaa states that retinal infatuation permeates every aspect of society
which leads to its manifestation in architecture.13 He postulates a causal
link between “contemporary life”, “architecture”, and how people “en-
counter” space.14 That is to say that the “seductive[ness]” of the “visual
image” causes a visually-flooded architecture, which in turn causes the hu-
man experience of designed spaces to lack the “full[ness]” afforded by the
human body.15 Pallasmaa concludes that this retinally-centric architecture
is inferior to an architecture that affords embodied experience.16 In the same
regard he argues that this retinal preference is a shortcoming for the archi-
tectural field because it “distance[s] itself from other-sense realms”.17 Pal-
lasmaa critiques the trends of retinal-centralism and lack of spaces catering
to the sensual body. He proactively claims that it is better to design space
to engage the body.18
Architectural theorist Alberto Pe´rez-Go´mez categorises the current state
of architecture as a product of the “rationalist program”, and calls for its
9 [Pallasmaa, 1996, 19]
10 [Pallasmaa, 1996, 19]
11 [Pallasmaa, 1991, 45]
12 [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 5]
13Pallasmaa is not the first theorist to claim a human fondness for the image. Guy De-
bord’s The Society of the Spectacle draws attention to the role of images in contemporary
society, along with contributions from other scholars such as Walter Benjamin, Henri Berg-
son and so on. [Wark, 2008, 9] Pallasmaa adds to the collective research by examining the
role of the ocular in architecture. [MacKeith, 2006, 152]
14 [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 5]
15 [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 5]
16As Pallasmaa notes, “one fundamental weakness of today’s architecture is its exclu-
sively visual character which puts it outside our emotions”. [Pallasmaa, 1991, 46]
17 [Pallasmaa, 1994, 16]
18 [Pe´rez-Go´mez and Parcell, 2004, 158], [Pallasmaa, 1996, 24]
3
metamorphosis.19 He suggests the need to transcend these circumstances
where “plans, elevations and sections are ultimately expected to predict
with accuracy an intended meaning as it may appear for an embodied sub-
ject in built work”.20 To do this, architects must project themselves into the
design similar in the same way modern artists and existential phenome-
nologists imagine the world.21 In other words, he advocates carefully con-
sidered “different use of projection, related to modern art and existential
phenomenology” to bring about a “truly relevant poetic practice [of archi-
tecture] in a Post-Modern world”.22 In this manner Pe´rez-Go´mez is an ad-
vocate for a more phenomenological and poetic understanding when cre-
ating spaces.
In a variation to Pe´rez-Go´mez’s position, but reverberating Pallasmaa’s
account, Vittorio Gregotti argues that the memory of philosophers’ con-
tributions lingers in architects’ minds while the philosophical details are
forgotten. Gregotti states:
The relationship between image and perception that was central to
those [philosophical] texts now forms a distant, almost always forgot-
ten background, while everyday language, and especially the everyday
language of architects, encompasses increasingly insistent talk that
makes image, along with its constriction and communication, into
a primary objective in design, or even a measure of the quality of a
project.23
Gregotti attributes this ‘forgetfulness’ to architecture’s “preoccupationwith
the market image” and to economic forces as contributing to problems of
the current state of “single-dimensional flatten[ed]” built spaces.24 He feels
that commercial pressures drive architects to design spaces which reach
their height of appeal in the still image. Or in his words, “all this leads to
the apparent triumph of the figurative gesturality of the ‘architect-creator’
and his compulsion for repetition, driven above all by the need to create a
19He states, “to transcend aestheticism, reductive functionalism, and either conventional
or experimental formalism, architecture must consider seriously the potential of narrative
as the structure of human life, a poetic vision realized in space-time, in the inbetween or
metaxy implied by Gelassenheit”. [Pe´rez-Go´mez and Parcell, 2004, 31] Consider also the
claim, “this intuition [of rationalist architecture] must now be radicalized if we are to tran-
scend the technological enframing”. [Pe´rez-Go´mez and Parcell, 2004, 30]
20 [Rattenbury, 2002, 3] Found in the essay; The revelation of order — perspective and archi-
tectural representation.
21 [Rattenbury, 2002, 5]
22 [Rattenbury, 2002, 5]
23 [Gregotti, 1996, 95]
24 [Gregotti, 1996, 99, 98]
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marketable image”.25 He positively proclaims that architects ought to “con-
struct new pieces of reality, thus modifying and enriching the world of our
experiences”.26 Gregotti’s argument is fourfold. Primarily the importance
of an experiential perception of space lies in the background of architecture.
However, due to commercial forces, architecture is dominated by the im-
age. Furthermore the power of the architectural image leads to vapid and
mundane spaces. Thus architecture must reconsider how to create spaces
that enrich human experience of the world.
Analogous to Gregotti’s position, Elizabeth Grosz sees the body as su-
perficially situated in contemporary architecture due to economic implica-
tions. She claims that the body is accepted as part of architecture —“it is
not that architecture excludes embodiment” — but that architecture fails
to meaningfully engage with the details of the body such as sexuality.27
She proposes that architecture needs a shift in “values by which to make
it profitable for architecture to think its own in investments in corporeal-
ity”.28 Like Gregotti, Grosz targets the economic drives of the building
industry as requiring change in order for the built environment to account
more equally for the experience of the body.
Alternatively, Rob Imrie finds an exclusion of embodiment through his
study architect’s conception of the human body. He finds that architects are
predominately guided by Cartesian principles resulting in designs either
“absent” or with “reductive conceptions” of the human body.29 He claims
that due to the structure of the discipline, the experience of the human body
is neglected.
This same argument for the limitations of architecture is seen in the dis-
cipline of philosophy, as Henri Lefebvre argues that the architect’s space is
“a visual space, a space reduced to blueprints, to mere images — to that
‘world of the image’ which is the enemy of the imagination”.30 Lefeb-
vre goes on to claim that in practice the architect imagines that they have
“complete freedom”. However, Lefebvremaintains, it is their duty to create
spaces that encourage poetic bodily thought.31 He writes:
25 [Gregotti, 1996, 98]
26 [Gregotti, 1996, 100]
27 [Grosz, 2001, 13]
28 [Grosz, 2001, 14] Full sentence, “the point is to affirm that it’s[the body] there, and to
find the right kind of terms and values by which to make it profitable for architecture to
think its own in investments in corporeality.”
29 [Imrie, 2003, 58 and 63] respectively.
30 [Lefebvre, 1991, 361]
31 [Lefebvre, 1991, 360]
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In what does sensory space, within social space, consist? It consists
in an ‘unconsciously’ dramatized interplay of relay points and obsta-
cles, reflections, references, mirrors and echoes — an interplay im-
plied, but not explicitly designated, by this discourse. . . a welcoming
space is called for — the space of nature, filled with non-fragmented
‘beings’, with plants and animals. (It is architecture’s job to reproduce
such a space where it is lacking.)32
Lefebvre prescribes the intact quality of “being” to the spaces of architec-
ture.33 I turn to another philosopher to analyse this concept.
1.1.2 Merleau-Ponty to the rescue
ChristianNorberg-Schulz, Juhani Pallasmaa, Rob Imrie, Alberto Pe´rez-Go´mez,
Vittorio Gregotti, Elizabeth Grosz, and Henri Lefebvre each claim that ar-
chitecture lacks valuable corporeal qualities. A phenomenological study
of the human experience establishes corporeal qualities for architectural
spaces. The research of Maurice Merleau-Ponty provides this study. David
Krell expresses Merleau-Ponty’s contribution as:
Merleau-Ponty’s body is not the Cartesian flesh cadaver, with its pli-
able springs and levers infinitely stilled. . .Merleau-Ponty’s theme is
the kinaesthetic body that moves through a world that is its own, a
world that is in some uncanny way itself flesh.34
Linking Merleau-Ponty’s account of the human body’s experience of space
with the previously discussed theorists’ critiques of architecture creates
grounds for designing rich corporeal architecture. In other words, some
architectural theorists claim contemporary spaces are lacking something;
that our built spaces are flat, reductive, instantly digested and expelled.35
They further call for architects to look at the experiential body and the ex-
perience of engaging with space. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the
body is unique in that it proposes a non-reflective bodily intelligence.36 It
is this understanding of the body that I aim to explain in the second and
third chapters of this thesis.
32 [Lefebvre, 1991, 210]
33 [Lefebvre, 1991, 210]
34 [Krell, 1997, 140]
35 [Gregotti, 1996, 98], [Imrie, 2003, 48], [Pallasmaa, 1996, 19]
36 [Smith and Thomasson, 2005, 273]
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phenomenology
Phenomenology is the study of finite experiences of the world.37 It is the
study of human experiences within space.38 A phenomenologist under-
stands events as available for study only through perception.39 The sub-
ject of a phenomenologist’s investigation is a phenomenon but, unlike the
physicist, the phenomenologist accounts for the perception of the observa-
tion rather than just the observation. The origins of phenomenology lie in
the work of Edmund Husserl.40 Merleau-Ponty describes phenomenology
as:
The study of essences. . . It tries to give a direct description of our ex-
perience as it is, without taking account of its psychological origin
and the causal explanations which the scientist, the historian or the
sociologist may be able to provide.41
This suggests that a phenomenologist does not postulate back stories for
why the experience happens as it does. Rather, the phenomenologist de-
scribes and structures the manifold of human experiences.42 A phenome-
nologist has no justification for positing non-perceivable explanations for
experience.43 In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty derives a
system of existence accounting for human experience. He claims that phe-
nomenology is the “return” to the “world of actual experience” which is
prior to the world created by analytical reflection.44 In this paper I abstract
an account of the human experience of space that is implicit in Merleau-
Ponty’s work.
37 [Sokolowski, 2000, 32]
38 [Sokolowski, 2000, 48, 66], [Heidegger, 1982, 28]
39 [Heidegger, 1982, 254]
40 [Spiegelberg and Schuhmann, 1981, 69] Husserl developed a phenomenological
method to account of the structure of the mental representations. [Dreyfus, 1989, 2] Husserl
defines this method as follows, “phenomenology: this term designates a science, a com-
plex of scientific disciplines; but it also designates at the same time and above all a method
and an attitude of thought: the specifically philosophical attuned of thought, the specifi-
cally philosophical method”. [Husserl, 1999, 19] “Husserl’s mature conception of the phe-
nomenological method includes the idea of descriptive clarification of the content (mean-
ing) of our acts through the procedure of free variation in imagination and through the
analysis of the “origins” of content”. [Smith and Smith, 1995, 457]
41 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, vii]
42 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 257]
43 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 243]
44 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 57] Merleau-Ponty’s argument here is not to indicate that intu-
ition is more reliable than critical thought. Rather, it is the critical study of human engage-
ments with the world that are apart of everyday life. This notion is analised in greater detail
is section 2.1.
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I examine the work of Merleau-Ponty rather than Martin Heidegger be-
cause, plainly said, Heidegger handles the “big picture” of existence and
Merleau-Ponty fleshes out the details of daily living.45 Heidegger is the
“source” for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (as well as a key influence
for many continental philosophers, e.g. Michel Foucault and Pierre Bour-
dieu.)46 However, Heidegger’s vocation is a study of the grandness of Be-
ing and not the details of the everyday.47 At present, I am captivated by the
commonplace qualities of architecture and for this reasonmy concentration
is on Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the human experience in space.
a few words about Merleau-Ponty
Merleau-Ponty is considered, “one of themost original and important philoso-
phers of the past century”.48 In 1945 he distinguished himself with the
work Phenomenology of Perception.49 Primarily he is a phenomenologist,
although his thinking does not afford pigeon-holing.50 As a phenome-
nologist he follows in the footprints of Edmund Husserl and Martin Hei-
degger.51 He is often mistaken as drawing more influence from Husserl
(due to a note in the preface of Phenomenology of Perception). However this
was the strategic manoeuvre of a Frenchman, in direct response to Hei-
degger’s unpopular associations with the Nazi Party.52 Philosophically,
Merleau-Ponty “could never accept Husserl’s doctrines, however enthu-
siastically he embraced the spirit of the enterprise as a whole”.53 Further-
more various Merleau-Ponty scholars, for instance; Charles Taylor, Richard
Shusterman, Judith Butler, Hebert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly each argue that
45 [Dreyfus, 2005b, 2]
46 [Dreyfus, 2005b, 1]
47 [Dreyfus, 2005b, 1]
48 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 1]
49 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, -] The Phenomenology of Perception is notably the richest of
Merleau-Ponty’s works, and according to Dreyfus it is the only book necessary in my bibli-
ography. [Dreyfus, 2008, -]
50 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 1]
51Husserl who took phenomenology from Hegel and developed a “more precise”
methodology and Heidegger who was a crucial “figure” of the discipline [Dreyfus and
Wrathall, 2006, 2]. Dreyfus explains Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology as fol-
lows, “for Husserl, phenomenology is a study of the structures of consciousness itself, so
that one can proceed to reflect on and systematically describe the contents of the conscious
mind in terms of their essential structures. This was a method, Husserl believed, which
could ground our knowledge of the world in our lived experience, without in the process
reducing the content of that knowledge to the contingent and subjective features of that
experience”. [Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2006, 2]
52 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 5]
53 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 8]
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Merleau-Ponty’s account of the human body’s capacity for non-reflective,
yet intentional, engagement with its surroundings is “his most profound
and original contribution to philosophy”.54 This idea, is the central philo-
sophical notion which I take fromMerleau-Ponty and apply to architecture.
It is important to note that Merleau-Ponty is well known for his be-
wildering writing manner and to avoid emulating this style I use two tac-
tics.55 Firstly, in chapter two I employ Hebert Dreyfus’ technique for fram-
ing Merleau-Ponty’s structure of the bodily faculty for thought, i.e., what
I call the form.56 Secondly, I use my own term the—thinking body—for the
principal concept I take from his theory. One of the first challenges with
reading Merleau-Ponty is determining whose argument is whose. This is
due to a style that involves diving into a leading view and elegantly ar-
guing for it with his own writing voice, then abruptly challenging that
view with the traditionally opposing philosophical camp and persisting
to follow the second view’s reasoning through, only to then dispute both
viewswith his own ideas.57 At the same timeMerleau-Ponty avoids itemis-
ing, defining and consistently employing terminology.58 Rather, he “cul-
tivates a deliberately non-adversarial dialectical strategy that is bound to
seem alien, even disconcerting, to anyone educated in the explicit theo-
retical assertions”.59 Because Merleau-Ponty rarely uses a single term to
indicate his philosophical ideas, I choose to apply the term thinking body
to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the faculty that affords intentional engage-
ment with space. Merleau-Ponty describes the phenomenon of the human
54 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 10] and [Dreyfus, 2005a, 2] and Kelly— “there is a pecu-
liarly bodily type of understanding of objects is the central point of Merleau-Ponty’s cate-
gory of motor intentionality: motor-intentional activity is a way of being directed toward
objects that essentially involves a motor or behavioural component”. [Robert C. Solomon,
2003, 132]
55 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 4]
56Hebert Dreyfus is a leading scholar is the field of phenomenology. “Hubert L. Dreyfus
is Professor of Philosophy in the Graduate School at the University of California, Berke-
ley”. [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 12] And, “Hubert Dreyfus demonstrate[s]. . . one of the
most important insights at work in Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenology” [Carman and
Hansen, 2005, 12] The following is written as an introduction of Dreyfus for the bookHeideg-
ger, Authenticity, and Modernity. “For more than a quarter of a century, Hubert L. Dreyfus
has been the leading voice in American philosophy for the continuing relevance of phe-
nomenology, particularly as developed by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty. Dreyfus has influenced a generation of students and a wide range of
colleagues” [Wrathall and Malpas, 2000a, back-cover] There are numerous quotation prais-
ing Dreyfus’ work, but this one more from Sean Kelly shall have to be enough, “Hubert
Dreyfus. . . [is] the foremost commentator on the work of the founders of modern phe-
nomenology - Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty — not to mention a gifted
phenomenologist himself”. [Wrathall and Malpas, 2000b, 161]
57 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 4] and [Spiegelberg and Schuhmann, 1981, 572]
58 [Dreyfus, 2005a, 2]
59 [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 4]
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body through chapters of poetic writing and never isolates the concept of
the thinking body with particular terminology. However words approach-
ing a denotation are: “body schema”, “field of presence”, a “primal acquisi-
tion”, or the phrase “a grouping of lived-through meanings which moves
towards its equilibrium” and “my body. . . as system of possible actions,
a virtual body with its phenomenal ‘place’ defined by its task and situa-
tion”.60
The thinking body has the capacity for a non-rule governed, non-reflective,
normative directiveness towards the spaces and elements that one distinct
from the individual’s body.61 For consistency, I call this directiveness bodily
intentionality.62 Merleau-Ponty introduces his concept of motor intentional-
ity as: “something which is an anticipation of, or arrival at, the objective
and is ensured by the body itself as a motor power”.63 A minor example
of bodily intentionality is the experience of walking through a gallery, be-
ing drawn to the left, dancing briefly in small steps back and forth, to find
oneself admiring an artist’s painting.64 The thinking body is that which
directed the individual to a particular position that offers an optimal view
of the painting. Yet this example is merely an introduction to the concept
of the thinking body that breaks into two ideas —its form and function—
which I analysis in chapters two and three. The conceptualisation of the
thinking body is complex, even though the concept is intended to describe
our everyday experience. As Merleau-Ponty wrote, “it is not easy to reveal
pure motor intentionality: it is concealed behind the objective world which
it helps to build up”65
60 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 206, 265, 216, 153, 250] Respectively.
61 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 110, 138]
62I use the term bodily intentionality consistently for discussingMerleau-Ponty’s term ‘mo-
tor intentionality’ [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 110] or ‘motor intention’ [Merleau-Ponty, 1962,
317] or Dreyfus’ terms ‘motor intentionality’ [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 144] and ‘bod-
ily intentionality’ or Sean Kelly’s ‘motor intentionality’ [Wrathall and Malpas, 2000a, 161]
David W. Smith’s term “non-positional consciousness” [Smith and Thomasson, 2005, 273]
or J. N. Mohanty’s ‘bodily intentionality’ [Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2006, 75] or D Seamon’s
“pre-cognitive intelligence of the body” [Seamon, 2000, 157].
63 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 110] Sean Kelly makes the further distinction between ‘move-
ment as a third person process’ as “reflex” movement and a bodily thinking movement
[Robert C. Solomon, 2003, 132] “thought as a representation of movement”.
64Along with the argument in chapter two, consider the following quotation from a pub-
lished Interviewwith Hebert Dreyfus,“the basic idea in Merleau-Ponty is that we’re always
moving to get an optimal grip. . . and he talks about how in a museum your body is led by a
picture to move to the optimal distance where you see the maximum richness, as he puts it,
of the detail and the maximum clarity of the form. And when you perceive ordinary objects
there’s a further thing, you move around them, and so forth, and you are led by the object
calling on your body – it’s just outside of what your mind does or could do. The object just
calls you to get in the best relation to see it. If you’re looking at a house from the front, you
also sense that you’d see it even better if you could also see the back”. [Dreyfus, 2005b, -]
65 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 138]
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1.1.3 Investigating architectural theorists who havewalked down
this path
A second inquiry regarding the theorists who promote the role of the phe-
nomenological body in architect results. The lack of architectural attention
to the experience of the human body. I suggest that some theorists who
claim something is missing in contemporary architecture omit the think-
ing body as they put forward the solution of phenomenology. Furthermore
by disregarding bodily intentionality their rendering of the phenomenon is
not correlative with the human experience of space.
To address this I critique the works of Juhani Pallasmaa and Steven
Holl. Pallasmaa is an architectural theorist who employs thework ofMerleau-
Ponty and Gaston Bachelard.66 Bachelard’s work lends itself to contempo-
rary theorists, who abstract elegantly composed sentences as evidence of
the importance of designing for the body. The outcome of this practice
achieves superficial conclusions; such as Michel Tournier’s paraphrase of
Bachelard in which Tournier literally concludes that “every true house has
a cellar and an attic”.67 In chapter Four I analysis Pallasmaa’s assertions
that architecture should be “creating existential microcosms [and] embod-
ied representations of the world” to observe if they are just as skin-deep
as Tournier’s.68 Pallasmaa promotes an architecture that caters to all the
body’s senses; placing the traditional five senses at centre stage, but this is
not an architecture that is phenomenologically founded.69
Pallasmaa advocates a system of design criteria based onMerleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological research.70 I shall argue that elements of his theory fail
to line up with Merleau-Ponty’s work.71 In chapter Four I identify the di-
vergence between Pallasmaa’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and
consider how the differences effect an architectural theory for the thinking
body. Likewise I identify the dissimilarities between the principles that ar-
chitect Steven Holl has professed to employ and those of Merleau-Ponty.
Holl’s work is briefly analysed in chapter Five, where I also indicate an ar-
chitectural direction for Merleau-Ponty’s theory through a study of three
architectural volumes created by Carlo Scarpa. I propose a pair of contex-
66Author of The Poetics of Space. Gaston Bachelard is considered to have contributed to
phenomenological architectural theory [Ballantyne, 2005, 33, 42, 43, 44] [Norberg-Schulz,
1971, 15]” and [Leach, 1997, 351]
67 [Ballantyne, 2005, 46] and [Tournier, 1998, 49]
68 [Pallasmaa, 2000, 2]
69 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 29]
70 [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 59], [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 4], [Pallasmaa, 2000, 2], [Pallasmaa, 1996, 31]
and 1999 article, Lived Space [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 129].
71 [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 5] and [Pallasmaa, 1991, 45]
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tual design solutions. The design solutions are a product of the analysis of
Merleau-Ponty’s implicit structure of the human experience of space which
is drawn out in chapters two and three. In short, after establishingMerleau-
Ponty’s implicit theory, these examines the manner in which architectural
theorists and architects render Merleau-Ponty’s research of the role of bod-
ily experience of space.
1.2 Aim
The aim of this research is to illuminate how the vividness of Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of the human body’s experience of space translates
to designing an impressive built world. The aims are threefold. Firstly, to
draw out a clear and sound account of Merleau-Ponty’s implicit structure
of the human experience of space. Secondly, to use this structure to critique
architectural theorists who are considered to have provided architects with
a translation of Merleau-Ponty’s research. Finally, to demonstrate a pair
of contextual design solutions aiming toward an architecture that caters
to the thinking body by looking at architectural volumes. The predominate
value of this work is the theoretical undertaking of accounting for Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of the bodily experience of space.
In acknowledging contemporary critiques of the field, I respond by of-
fering an account of Merleau-Ponty’s research and a reaching of how peo-
ple within the field have responded to it. Considering that architects are
intrinsic in the design of the built environment, it is critical that an aware-
ness of the thinking body plays a role in design. Through clarifying the
experience of the body in space my intention is to shift the emphasis of de-
sign from the analytical to the corporeal. As Merleau-Ponty notes: “nature
is not itself geometrical, and it appears so only to a careful observer who
contents himself with macrocosmic data”.72 The particular designs that re-
sult from this thinking process should be as varied as the designers who
created them.
1.3 Scope
In order to establish a stronger essence of human bodily experience within
the field of architecture the scope of this paper is limited. It is confined to an
72 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 56]
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individual human engagement with his or her surrounding built environ-
ment. I examine the semi-private spaces of offices, museums and houses.
I consider the entrance ways to buildings, and their fac¸ades, as the build-
ing’s introductory impact. As well as the details of architectural elements
such as door knobs and light switches, I will address a scale between the
details of thresholds and the proportions of a room.
I also examine individual adults who are able-bodied and move about
their environment by foot. To achieve this I draw upon the works of the-
orists who have bound their research to this type of human engagement.
SinceWorldWar II the number of white-collar workers inWestern or Global
cultures has dramatically increased. For example, in the United States
white-collar workers today account for almost fifty percent of the labour
force, outnumbering blue-collar workers by approximately eleven million
persons.73 The environments made for such workers restrict physical chal-
lenges to the body in order to funnel an individual’s efforts to analytical
task solving. This streamlining extends beyond the desk, outside the office
and to the whole of a business district, where the built-environment affords
only the challenges of what style of coffee to order, or how to best take ad-
vantage of sharing an elevator ride with the company’s head. It is these
spaces and this quality of human organisation that I address.
1.4 A profile of the thesis
This thesis is comprised of three primary components. In short; a philoso-
phy of the body’s experience of space, a critique of the theoretical applica-
tion of the thinking body to architecture, and finally a study of built archi-
tecture that approaches this philosophy. More precisely this breaks down
to the following outline.
I firstly justify the call for attention to the bodily experience of space
within architectural theory (chapter One). I then provide an understanding
of the form of the thinking body (chapter Two). I follow this by explaining
the function of the thinking body, a topic that engages with the metaphys-
ical act of determining space (chapter Three). From these two chapters, I
tease out an implicit structure of human experience resident in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy. In turn, I use this structure to critique Juhani Pallas-
maa’s popular account of Merleau-Ponty’s work (chapter Four). Lastly, I
consider architectural volumes in line with the theory, via a comprehensive
case study of the architectural practices of Carlo Scarpa (chapter Five).
73 [CEE, 2003, -]
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Although I strive to adopt the writing style of the discipline of architec-
ture, I have deliberately incorporated a few useful devices I acquired from
my previous philosophical training. One practice is to use the footnotes
to stratify the relevance of information. Throughout this thesis I provide
supplementary points, comments, and support in the footnotes. The sup-
plementary discussion is an additional layer of richness to the overall ar-
gument that is not strictly essential for my justification. With this noted the
majority of the footnotes are merely citations of texts. I shall mention that I
attempt to prioritise the use of simple words and descriptions over the em-
ployment of philosophical jargon. I limit philosophical terms to those that
justify the time to be adequately explained and historically contextualised.
Lastly, due to the lack of a he or she pronoun in the English language, I
have chosen to the practice of alternating pronouns each paragraph.74 As
such, I use he for the architect in the first paragraph and she for the architect
in the following paragraph and so on.
74 [Williams, 2000, 35]
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Chapter 2
The Form; identifying the
thinking body
Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps
the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sus-
tains it inwardly, and with it forms a system. When I walk round my
flat, the various aspects in which it presents itself to me could not pos-
sibly appear as views of one and the same thing if I did not know that
each of them represents the flat seen from one spot or another, and if I
were unaware of my own movements, and of my body as retaining its
identity through the stages of those movements. I can of course take
a mental bird’s eye view of the flat, visualize it or draw a plan of it
on paper, but in that case too I could not grasp the unity of the object
without the mediation of bodily experience, for what I call a plan is
only a more comprehensive perspective: it is the flat ‘seen from above’,
and the fact that I am able to draw together in it all habitual perspec-
tives is dependent on my knowing that one and the same embodied
subject can view successively from various positions.1
Within this chapter I expound Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological de-
piction of the thinking body as a means of understanding human experien-
tial space. I do not critique Merleau-Ponty’s rendering of the phenomenon.
Rather I analyse it so that I can then use it to critique phenomenological
architectural theorists and derive design solutions. In the previous chap-
ter I introduced a range of architectural theorists to support my claim that
1 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 203]
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contemporary architecture falls short of providing for the human body’s
experience of space. I proposed that Merleau-Ponty’s investigation into the
field of perception is relevant to designing spaces for humans, even though
he never directly investigated the field of architecture.
In representing the thinking body I will first explain the concepts phe-
nomena and embodiment. Secondly, I will walk through the experience of
acquiring a new skill. This description assumes that a close examination of
the process of an adult learning a new skill exhibits the phenomenon of the
thinking body. That is, as an individual person acquires a skill, the skill is
housed, not as a representation in the mind, but as a bodily readiness to re-
spond to situations in the spatial world. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “what
counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body as it in fact is, as a
thing in objective space, but as a system of possible actions”.2 This system
of possible actions is the form of the thinking body. This chapter provides
the reader with a practical understanding of this bodily faculty of thought.
In the following chapter I progress to the central act of the thinking body—
the synthesis of one’s spatial situation.
2.1 Phenomena
A phenomenon, simply put, is an individual’s finite experience that is af-
forded to all human beings.3 For example, an experience that I individually
have of hearing the bells of the clock-tower is a phenomenon. While I per-
ceive the ringing individually, the experience is available for others to also
have. Merleau-Ponty describes phenomena, bothmore obscurely andmore
2 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 250] The sentence concludes as, “. . . a virtual body with its phe-
nomenal ‘place’ defined by its task and situation”.
3During a long telephone conversation with my mother — one of those where I endeav-
oured to explain what exactly I had been doing; the cupcake metaphor transpired. I have
since become rather fond of this analogy, due to its effects on those unexpectant people
who receive an honest answer to, ”And, what do you do?” Talk of cupcakes seems to afford
the inquirer to breath out and dispense with any armour that discussion of my thesis often
provokes. The idea is that, if the whole of experience — the world, the imagination of all
that is imaginable, and all that can be experienced, i.e. that-which-is, that-which-exists —
is a grand, multi-layered and tiered cake, with fillings and frostings and sprinkles; then, a
phenomenon is a cupcake. Some phenomena have fillings, some have frosting, some have
all the above and more. The art of the phenomenologist is to choose the right ones to study.
AsMerleau-Ponty states, “wemust examine some exceptional case in which it disintegrates
and reforms before our eyes”. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244] The difference between the world
and a phenomenon is like the difference between the grand cake and a cupcake; that is, a
cupcake, can be picked up with one hand and tasted in one bite. Phenomenon are small
and limited, like cupcakes; they are thereby the more easily understandable experiences of
the world.
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entirely as, “the layer of living experience through which other people and
things are first given to us, the system ‘Self-others-things’ as it comes into
being”.4 The idea is that phenomena compose the murky substance that
is an individual’s link to that outside one’s self. Phenomena are the links
themselves, rather than that which is linked to. Hence, when hearing the
clock tower bells ringing— the phenomenon is the individual’s connection
to the tower bells sounds; there are two ’things’, i.e., the individual and
the bells. The connection exist between the sounding of the bells and the
individual hearing it. The link is that, “perceptual ’something’ ” that “is
always in the middle of something else”.5 The link is the phenomenon.
Employing the example of the person hearing the clocktower bells ring,
Merleau-Ponty’s description of “self-other-things” can be drawn as :6
Figure 2.1: Self-thing-other i.e., a phenomenon
Although the link is a “perceptual something”, it is not confined to the
cognitive realm.7 Merleau-Ponty asserts that “the ‘phenomenon’ is not a
‘state of consciousness’, or a ‘mental fact’, and the experience of phenom-
ena is not an act of introspection or an intuition”.8 A phenomenon is some-
4 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 57]
5 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 4]
6 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 57] The drawing is a working drawing I developed during the
research for this thesis.
7 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 4]
8 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 57]
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thing above and beyond the creative powers of themind.9 Hence, the study
of phenomena is an investigation into the links between individual human
beings and things within space.10 And, this investigation is not confined to
the thoughts and imaginations of individuals.
In short, a phenomenon has the following qualities; (a) it is not the same
as one’s subjective experience of something, (b) technically, two different
people can have different phenomena of the same phenomenon, and (c)
the temporal extension of a phenomenon is not well defined; although it
is necessarily finite and usually short.11 The art of the phenomenologist is
in picking the right phenomenon to study. As Merleau-Ponty sees it: “we
must examine some exceptional case in which it disintegrates and reforms
before our eyes”.12
2.2 Embodiment, a body as more than flesh and bones
Our body, to the extent that it moves itself about, that is, to the extent
that it is inseparable from a view of the world and is that view itself
brought into existence, is the condition of possibility, not only of the
geometrical synthesis, but of all expressive operations and all acquired
views which constitute the cultural world.13
The body of embodiment is not the body of science which is researched and
examined as a thing. Merleau-Ponty claims, “the scientist. . . see[s] his body
as others saw it, and conversely see[s] the bodies of others as mechanical
things with no inner life”.14
9While the finer details of the philosophical implication of this link or “phenomenal
field” being part of an inner world or outer world are crucial to philosophers who interpret
Merleau-Ponty as idealist or realist; greater study into the distinction goes beyond the con-
fines of this paper and the role for an architectural understanding of the potential impacts
of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 57]
10In the following section, ‘things within space’ is defined further.
11 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 57-59]
12 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244] For example “the cases of vision without retinal inversion”.
[Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244] or Wertheimer’s mirror experiment [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 250].
13 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 388]
14 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 95]
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Figure 2.2: Paolo Mascagni, Anatomiae universae icones (Images of Universal
Anatomy), (1755-1815)
The scientific body can be metaphorically understood as a theatre with the
floodlights on: valuable for critiquing the interior elements, but
obstructive for viewing the performance on stage.15 Embodiment
concerns the experiential human body; the body as a theatre with the
floodlights off, ideal for taking in the play.16 The body of embodiment is
the body as experienced during the act of living.
This leads to claiming that when architects envision human space, the
embodied human cannot be represented by a cubic meter volume. That is,
the phenomenological body is not the architect’s geometrical body, which
Andrew Ballantyne depicts as, “a ‘forth’ dimensionally, between a two-
dimensional plane and a three-dimensional volume”.17 Instead, the em-
bodied human postulates the actions of the metaphorical actor on stage.
The theoretical move is to understanding the human body as extending
into its surroundings and engaging with objects in a non-reflective yet di-
rected fashion. This shifts the emphasis away from mathematical dimen-
sions towards descriptive phenomenon while retaining awareness of the
body as described by science.
Merleau-Ponty analyses embodiment through an experience of the phan-
tom limb. In particular, he considers a patient who continues to experience
15The metaphor of the theatre with the floodlights arose in Professor Dreyfus’ Lectures
on the Phenomenology of Perception in 2002.
16 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 100]
17 [Ballantyne, 2005, 254]
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his missing limb as if it were still present as it was before amputated.18
To explain this phenomenon he draws on empirical research and discov-
ers that the patient experiences the absent limb for example, a hand as a
correlate of those aspects of the world which speak to the hand, namely,
the doorknob to be opened, the coffee mug to be grasped and so forth.19
When the patient restructures his world in such a manner that the things
no longer beckon to the lost limb, then the experience of the phantom limb
vanishes. Merleau-Ponty explains that “the body is our general medium
for having a world.”20 In the practical sense, the patient’s environment has
changed when the the doorknob no longer affords to be grasped from the
right, and likewise it is the left hand which knows to reach out and grasp
the coffee mug.
For Merleau-Ponty, “a world” is the spatial situation within which an
individual is mentally and physically positioned.21 The body is orientated
in a world by means of three classifications; innate structures, basic gen-
eral skills and cultural skills.22 Innate embodiment refers to the most basic
physical qualities of the human body, such as cells, blood, organs and the
likes. The basic general skills are simple means by which the body engages
with a world, such as “dancing” or walking.23 Cultural skills are when
tools are conceived of and employed by the body. I further distinguish a
subsection of cultural skills as the style in which the individual engages
with the world.
2.2.1 Innate structures
Innate structures are the physical shapes and inherent capacities of the hu-
man body, i.e, the “biology” of the body.24 Innate structures include the fact
that the body has two arms, two legs, two hands, one head, all of a certain
size, consistency and so on.
In granting a physical body Merleau-Ponty also grants the existence
of physical things independent to the body.25 One way the metaphysi-
cal world can be metaphorically sliced exposes the world as composed of
18 [Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 142]
19 [Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 142]
20 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 146]
21 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 146]
22 [Dreyfus, 1996, 1]
23 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 146]
24 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 146]
25This idea is given detailed analysis in section 3.2.
20
physical things. In this regard the innate structure of the human body is a
physical thing. He maintains: “I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around
me intentions which are not dependent upon my decisions and which af-
fect my surroundings in a way which I do not choose”.26 In stating this,
Merleau-Ponty asserts three metaphysical aspects; (a) human beings have
physical bodies, (b) there exists something other than the body that is inde-
pendent of the body’s perception of it, and (c) there is a fundamental and
necessary causal connection between the physical body and that which ex-
ists independently of it.27
2.2.2 Basic general skills
Embodiment is more than the innate structures and “it is inadequate to say
that my body is. . . a phenomenon in which the totality takes precedence
over the parts”.28 In accounting for the phenomenon the basic general
skills category encompasses the physical body, the space in which the body
moves, and the learned connection between the two; i.e. ‘motor habits’.29
Consider the following quotation in which Merleau-Ponty examines the
experience of holding a smoking pipe:
If I stand holding my pipe in my closed hand, the position of my hand
is not determined discursively by the angle which it makes with my
forearm, and my forearm with my upper arm, and my upper arm
with my trunk, and my trunk with the ground. I know indubitably
where my pipe is, and thereby I know where my hand and my body
are, as primitive man in the desert is always able to take his bearings
immediately without having to cast his mind back, and add up dis-
tances covered and deviations made since setting off.30
26 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 440]
27‘B’ is a claim against Idealism, and to a relevant extent is analysis in chapter three. That
which is outside the confinements of this paper, is the placing Merleau-Ponty in either the
Realist or Idealist camp. It is also in direct response to the notion of freedom argued in
Sartre’s L’Etre et le Neamt. Consider the following assertion which targets Sartre’s argument
regarding the freedom of striding over mountains, “these intentions are general in a double
sense: firstly in the sense that they constitute a system in which all possible objects are
simultaneously included: if the mountain appears high and upright, the tree appears small
and sloping; and furthermore in the sense that they are not simply mine, they originate
from other than myself, and I am not surprised to find them in all psycho-physical subjects
organized as I am”. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 440]
28 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 100]
29 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 146] Additionally, “Merleau-Ponty uses ‘habit’ as synonymous
with ‘skill,’ so when he wants to refer to skill acquisition he speaks of ‘the acquisition of a
habit’ ” [Dreyfus, 1996, 2]
30 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 100] emphasis my own.
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Figure 2.3: Paul Ce´zanne,Man Smoking a Pipe, 1895-1900
Basic general skills (such as smoking, or reaching to a coffee mug) are
the links between the physical structures of the body along with its sur-
rounding elements of space. The body’s ability to recognise that which af-
fords walking on, squeezing through, reaching for, and so on, fall under the
classification of basic general skills of embodiment.31 These basic skills are
generally catered for in contemporary architecture.32 That is, buildings are
structurally sound, doors are human size, and countertops are reachable to
the general populous.
2.2.3 Cultural skills
Lastly, cultural skills relate to the elements in our living environment that
vary from culture to culture. Dreyfus explains this cultural embodiment
as, “each person not only incorporates his culture, but also his sub-culture
and the understanding of human beings”.33 Cultural skills represent in-
struments of the built world which the body knowingly engages with but
are distinct in time and place.
31 [Dreyfus, 1996, 1]
32 [Gins and Arakawa, 2002, 43]
33 [Dreyfus, 1989, 4] In regards to the Idealism vs. Realism issue the sentence continues
to note “. . .which is, of course, not private but is a variation on the shared public world”.
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styles of engagement
I distinguish the variation of style of engaging within embodied cultural
skills. Styles of cultural skills can be an individual’s vocation — such as ar-
chitect, mathematician, plumber, artist, monk, computer programer, teacher
— or the person’s defining characteristic — for instance questioner, fighter,
critic, child, political, spiritual and the likes. In the final paragraph of Phe-
nomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty heralds the subdivision of cultural
skills:
I am a psychological and historical structure, and have received, with
existence, a manner of existing, a style. All my actions and thoughts
stand in a relationship to this structure, and even a philosopher’s
thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold on the world, and
what he is. . . this certain significance of nature and history which I
am, does not limit my access to the world, but on the contrary is my
means of entering into communication with it.34
The individual’s style of cultural skills effects how the limits of the things
independent to human beings show up to the individual. This is more fun-
damental than how the individual conceives of the limitation associated
with her surrounding environment. The limit can seem pre-established
when the individual considers them. However, the limits only become
established when the body grasps them and they manifest the details or
richness of the individual’s spatial situation. Style also effects how the in-
dividual works within the limits. For instance, a stack of wood blocks out-
side my window will show up differently in terms of what it is and what
it can be used for, variously, the architect, the firefighter, the farmer, or the
child.35
an example to illustrate these structures
To draw out these distinctions of embodiment, particularly cultural embod-
iment, consider the phenomena of engaging with an elevator button. Phys-
ically elevator buttons are placed where human hands can reach them, ful-
filling the innate structural element of embodiment. Secondly, the pushing
skill is a basic handmotion. Thirdly, the reaction to push an elevator button
34 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 455] Emphasis my own.
35I return to this topic in the following chapter and in the final conclusion.
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is a cultural skill.36 That elevator buttons afford pushing is unique to con-
temporary global people. A given person steps into an elevator and finds a
dozen buttons along the wall at about hand height, the person reaches out
and pushes a single button which indicates a stop at a signal floor level;
viz. just one of the dozen buttons affords my hand’s push, and the hand
reaches out and appropriately pushes it.
However, the cultural skill of elevator button pushing was not estab-
lished amongst the the modern businessman of the 1950s. Similarly, con-
sider a person from a remote and non-global environment. Both people
have the innate structure and basic general skills to push the elevator but-
tons, yet lack the cultural skills that afford the buttons to show up as push-
able.37 Hence push-ablity is a cultural constant.
Figure 2.4: Elevator Attendant in Jacques Tati’s film Play Time
36For further discussion of culture skills see J.J. Gibson or Hubert Dreyfus, such as, “J.J.
Gibson, like Merleau-Ponty, sees that characteristics of the human world, e.g. what affords
walking on, squeezing through, reaching, etc. are correlative with our bodily capacities and
acquired skills, but he then goes on, in one of his papers, to add that mail boxes afford
mailing letters. This kind of affordance calls attention to a third aspect of embodiment.
Affords-mailing-letters is clearly not a cross-cultural phenomenon based solely on body
structure, nor a body structure plus a skill all normal human beings acquire. It is an af-
fordance that comes from experience with mail boxes and the acquisition of letter-mailing
skills. The cultural world is thus also correlative with our body; this time with our acquired
cultural skills”. [Dreyfus, 1996, 1]
37 [Zhou, 2008, 4]
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In the 1950s, elevator technology developed to have automatic landing
positioning and no longer required a human elevator operator using the
complex motor controller.38 However, elevators in corporate offices were
still manned with human operators up until the nineteen sixties.39 The cul-
tural embodiment of the modern business class of the 1950s did not encom-
pass an elevator interface that afforded the cultural skill of button pushing.
For a five year old, in the same elevator, all the buttons afford pushing.
The variance of the child’s embodiment of cultural skills to those of adults,
accounts for the child’s reaction to elevator buttons. For children, more
buttons physically afford pushing. Children live in the same culture, but
have a different style, with differing norms and governing principals. Hu-
man engagement with elevators demonstrates a structure in which a given
space appears to users through a multitude of spatial compositions. Hence,
designing for an embodied human involves consideration of the body’s in-
nate structures, basic general skills, cultural skills and to some degree styles
of cultural engagement.
2.3 Skill acquisition as ameans of recognising the think-
ing body
Some designs have elements arranged so obscurely that the design impairs
the body’s ability to learn. Consider a room with a maverick light switch
concealed behind the entry door and at knee level. Or think of a step only
one hundred millimetres placed in an otherwise banal quarter of a room.
Lastly, consider the clear glass opening doors inserted into neo-classical
buildings with no forwarding of their existence. These elements each re-
quire reflective analysis of the spatial situation. An individual engaging
with the hidden, knee-high light switch has to think to herself, where is
the light switch? Even after multiple experiences with the hidden switch,
it still remains a tricky element to learn, because it diverges from the rest of
the individual’s experience of the urban surroundings, and because of the
lack of increments of divergent switches in the space leading to the knee
level one. Likewise, the small step in the room corresponds to no other el-
ements, and the body has to learn to engage with its existence exclusively
through memory, rather than, a general understanding of causal connec-
tions; i.e. if there’s a narrowed space, then there might be a step.40 Lastly,
38 [Garris, 2006, 76]
39 [Taub, 1998, 12] and [Eggener, 2004, 194]
40The concept of causal connection is given detailed attention in section 5.2.3.
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a clear glass door hide its existence until a body crashes into them. It is
the analytically reflective understanding that warns the body, ‘slow down,
this is a post-modern district of town, shops usually have doors, there’s
probably something there blocking that opening’.
In this section, I discuss an example in which the body learns to non-
reflectively engage with it surrounding space. The point of this section is
twofold. On one hand, I aim to draw the reader’s attention to the existence
of the thinking body. And on the other, I work to illustrate elements that
enable the body to learn.
Many of the skills we employ are learnt over time and at a young age
via trial and error (such as walking and talking).41 These skill sets com-
prise simple yet important ways in which we engage with our surround-
ings. For instance, “the light of a candle changes its appearance for a child
when, after a burn, it stops attracting the child’s hand and becomes liter-
ally repulsive”.42 Learning a new skill changes the way things emerge to
the learner. Once the child knows that fire can burn, the fire itself is less
attractive to the child’s hand. It is not the case that the candle still draws
the child’s hand, but that the child no longer reaches for it because, upon
reflection, he remembers the experience of the heat. Rather, the flame itself
shows up to the child’s body as something that is not desirable to touch
and no reflection about the possibility of touch is undertaken.
In Dreyfus’ framework for skill acquisition there are five phases through
which a person ascends when learning a new skill. These are the phases of
Novice, Advanced Beginner, Competence, Proficient and Expertise.43 This or-
dering is consistent, but it is not necessarily the case that an individual will
progress through all the stages to become an expert.44 The examination
reveals various stages by which the body interacts with space, which can
translate to a number of ways an individual engages with space.45 Sec-
ondly, it illustrated elements that enable the body to learn.
In pre´cis the skill phase proceed as follows. The novice is unobstructed
by tangential tasks, but is well known to be slow and awkward due to the
need to bring to mind all of the instructor’s rules.46 In the following phase
41 [Dreyfus, , 1] Dreyfus uses the effective examples of learning to drive a manual auto-
mobile and learning to be a master chess player. While his work is most convincing, his
terminology is embedded within the language of the philosophical discipline.
42 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 52]
43 [Dreyfus, , 1] I am aware that these are not all the same parts of speech. However, I
have chosen to draw upon the work of Hubert Dreyfus, and I shall employ his labels.
44 [Dreyfus, , 1] and [Dreyfus, 1996, 1]
45 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 268]
46 [Dreyfus, 1996, 2]
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the advanced beginner takes in related aspects of the situation and extends
the task to include situational context.47 Here the student begins to un-
derstand his activity effects beyond the original set of the instructor’s con-
sequential rules. Then the competent learner begins to make ad hoc judge-
ments based on logical analysis while reacting to circumstantial elements
in addition the taught actions.48 This is the first phase where the student
begins to take responsibility for the outcome of his decisions. Due to a shift
in motivation brought about via positive and negative experience, in the
proficient phase the student intuitively feels the problem, without reflection
but must decide logically how to respond.49 Finally, the expert intuitively
feels the problem and feels the best way to respond.50 Hence for the expert,
time is not occupied with calculating decisions, as elements in space intu-
itively afford response. The expert uses bodily intentionality of the think-
ing body. For the expert, as aspects of space become present, the thinking
body syntheses elements and responds to them independently of the re-
flective capacities of the mind. This process creates the uninterrupted flow
of intentionality that is observable in people highly developed of particular
skills.
Consider case of a person leaning to tramp in a wilderness reserve. The
instructor of the novice tramper reduces the actions of tramping to a few
essential rules which do not require interpretation. For instance, if the
trail looks unstable, then the novice is directed to probe the ground gen-
tly prior to putting weight on it and to rest every fifty minutes to avoid
over-straining. The student is taught a set of rules that are independent
from the overall experience of tramping. This allows the novice to be un-
encumbered by tangential tasks and focus on employing the instructor’s
rules. During this phase, the learner reflects on abstracted rules and does
not engage with the potential aptitude of the thinking body. Still following
rules, the advanced beginner tramper learns more consequences of her ac-
tions; such as when climbing down a steep track, it can be helpful to grab
onto the nearby trees for support. Once the tramper reaches the competent
phase, she is exposed to more challenging paths; perhaps involving river
crossings, steeper grades, and muddy bogs. When hiking down a steep
grade, the learner still watches the ground and nearby trees to see where
to place her feet and hands, but the judgement is quicker because more
spaces show up as affording the foot or hand. However, when walking
along a path that has become a bog with a few logs arbitrarily floating in
the mud, the competent tramper must slow her gait and consider the size
47 [Dreyfus, 1996, 3]
48 [Dreyfus, , 3]
49 [Dreyfus, , 6]
50 [Dreyfus, , 6]
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of the log and the flatness and slipperiness of the surface before proceed-
ing. The competent learner still depends on reflecting on abstract rules, but
begins to experience non-reflective engagement as some physical surfaces
and tools show up to the learner. The proficient tramper response is swifter
and more efficient than the competent tramper but still slower than the ex-
pert tramper. For example, if the proficient tramper is descending a steep
trail that has recently suffered massive slips due to prolonged rains and
the ground ahead begins to fall away as she proceeds, then proficient tram-
per intuitively realises that the path may slip away under her feet in the
next few steps.51 She must then analytically reflect to respond, i.e., whether
to leap across the path quickly or halt and ease her way across the trail.52
Valuable time is lost while reflecting on the consequences of the decision,
but the tramper is more likely to negotiate the trail smoothly than the com-
petent tramper who spends additional time deciding what the problem is,
based on ground saturation, angle of descent, gravitational forces and her
own speed of movement.53 The proficient learner utilises a more stream-
lined and non-reflective engagement as the spaces and elements around
her that form affordances calling for use or avoidance.54
The expert tramper moves along the trail with her mind unconcerned
with consequential rules. Certain surfaces show up as affording her foot,
while others do not. She does not decide which surface to use, her feet and
hands reach for the optimal spaces. She no longer looks at the ground or the
path and think about how best to negotiate it. Rather, the positions show
up and movements are performed intuitively.55 The expert learner depends
only on the non-reflective engagement with space, i.e. the capacity of the
thinking body. Analytical reflection slows down the bodily response to the
situation.56
51 [Dreyfus, , 4]
52 [Dreyfus, , 4]
53 [Dreyfus, , 5]
54In other words the dominance of analytical intentionality gives way to bodily inten-
tionality.
55Merleau-Ponty describes this in terms of a table, “the surface which I am about to rec-
ognize as the surface of the table, when vaguely looked at, already summons me to focus
upon it, and demands those movements of convergence which will endow it with its ‘true’
aspect” [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 318]
56The expert learner engages with the situation with her bodily intentionality rather than
analytical intentionality. For further persuasion, consider Dreyfus’ example of an expert ac-
tion. “The expert driver, not only feels in the seat of his pants when speed is the issue; he
knows how to perform the appropriate action without calculating and comparing alterna-
tives. On the off-ramp, his foot simply lifts off the accelerator and applies the appropriate
pressure to the brake. What must be done, simply is done. As Aristotle says, the expert
‘straightaway’ does ‘the appropriate thing, at the appropriate time, in the appropriate way.’
” [Dreyfus, , 6]
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Figure 2.5: then at one point i did not need to translate the notes; they went
directly to my hands, Francesca Woodman, Providence, Rhode Island, 1976
2.4 Conclusion
As humans, we find ourselves in spatial situations that our bodies physi-
cally and intuitively engage with. We acquire skills through our experience
of living in a complex and varied world and our capacity to learn through
engaged experience. Looking at the phenomenon reveals the theory that
human beings have a mode of engagement with space, in which the body
responds to situations in the designed environment in a non-rule-governed
fashion with non-representational motivators. All bodies are thinking, the
expert learn is simply further developed. Examining the phases of learning
a skill demonstrates the role of the thinking body and how it can learn.
I return to this conclusion in chapter Five by considering architecture
that provides space to develop the skills of bodily intentionality by avoid-
ing the tricking the body with designs such as the maverick light-switch
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and instead sets up opportunities for the body to recognise causal connec-
tion. In the following chapter, I look into the metaphysical ramifications
of this human faculty in regards to creating spaces. Following that, I use
this analysis of the experience of being in space to critique contemporary
architectural theorists.
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Chapter 3
The Function; the thinking
body as maker of space
Space is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are arranged,
but the means whereby the position of things becomes possible.1
In the previous chapter the thinking body was addressed through a se-
quence of examples constructed to draw the reader’s attention to the body’s
capacity to intentionally engage with space and elements of space. The aim
of that chapter was to identify the inherent structure that affords the inten-
tional actions of the human body. The present chapter analyses the actions
afforded by that faculty. In other words, the previous chapter focused on
the form of the thinking body. This chapter focuses on the function, an the
activity Merleau-Ponty describes as the “motion which generates space”.2
The function of the thinking body is the act of intentionally drawing
upon that which is independent of human beings, and through engage-
ment determining the sensual richness of the independent “in-itself”.3 Merleau-
Ponty’s implicit structure of the human experience of space postulates a
non-reflective intentional engagement with indeterminate possibilities that
constructs determinate spatial situations. This account of human experi-
1 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 243]
2 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 387]The purpose of this chapter is to explain the action of the
thinking body, that is, how the actions of the thinking body create space.
3 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 294] Note citation is for quoted concept only. Could also be
referred to as “the thing itself” or “the ipseity of the thing” [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 233] This
chapter’s objective is accounting for this claim.
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ence suggests that a closer reading of associated philosophical texts will
provide new avenues for architectural exploration.
Rob Imrie and Alberto Pe´rez-Go´mez are contemporary theorists who
have sought to call attention to the architectural study of phenomenological
texts. I shall begin this chapter with a brief overview of what these scholars
have added to the discipline of architecture. I then analyse the function
of the thinking body. I start the analysis by summarising the source and
meaning of the term, intentionality. I go on to examine the function of bodily
intentionality and its relationship to architecture. This chapter provides an
account of Merleau-Ponty’s implicit structure of the human experience of
space, which I then employ in the following two chapters as a means of
theoretical critique and a starting point for design solutions.
Rob Imrie’s contribution
In an article titled, Architects’ Conceptions of the Human Body, geography
professor Rob Imrie surveys contemporary architects’ conceptions of the
human body.4 Parallel to the theorists I discussed in chapter one, Imrie
sees the contemporary state of architecture as reflecting the “dominance of
bodily reductive conceptions in architecture” and he “call[s] for an archi-
tecture that recognises, and responds to, the diversity of bodily needs in the
built environment”.5 What Imrie adds to the dialogue on phenomenologi-
cal architecture is a summary of how architects have considered the human
body.
Imrie concludes that architects generally give scant regard to the body.6
He provides the following segment of an interview with a practising archi-
tect as representative of architect’s conceptualisation of the human body:
Interviewer: “When you think of the body you seek to design for what
sort of body is that?”
Respondent: “You mean a human body?”
Interviewer: “Yes.”
Respondent: “That is an obscure question. Gosh.”7
4 [Imrie, 2003, 51]
5 [Imrie, 2003, 48, 64] Respectively.
6Or that “architects also tend to operate with partial and reductive conceptions of the
human body”. [Imrie, 2003, 63]
7 [Imrie, 2003, 55]
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Imrie argues that architects need to acknowledge and cater to the multiplic-
ity of bodily needs.8 He directs his readers to Merleau-Ponty’s view of the
body as “conjoined” to the built environment.9 Imrie identifies a dominant
reductive notion of the human body and points to Merleau-Ponty’s theory
in his conclusion. He offers Merleau-Ponty’s claim that, “far frommy body
being for me no more than a fragment of space, there would be no space at
all for me if I had no body”.10 However, he rests there without accounting
for why the reader should believe the body is united with space, or how
such a connection would transpire.
This move is similar to that of Alberto Pe´rez-Go´mez, who also iden-
tifies Merleau-Ponty as a source for understanding the human body. Yet
again, Pe´rez-Go´mez undertakes a project different to explaining how and
why Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the human body functions in non-
philosophical terminology. Pe´rez-Go´mezwrites that: “according toMerleau-
Ponty we don’t merely ‘have’ a body, we ‘are’ our bodies”.11 Explaining
how and why this metaphysical structure is possible, and how it works, is
explain in the remainder of this chapter.
3.1 Intentionality, and its metamorphosis
A new conception of intentionality. . . which treats the experience of
the world as a pure act of constituting consciousness.12
To account for the notion of intentionality I begin by relating the origin and
development of the term itself. I then clarify the distinctions that Merleau-
Ponty adds to the term. Finally (in the following section) I analyse the
fundamental act of the thinking body as a “mediator of a world”.13
8 [Imrie, 2003, 64]
9 [Imrie, 2003, 64]
10 [Imrie, 2003, 64]
11 [Pe´rez-Go´mez, 2006, 95] Consider also the following description. “For Merleau-Ponty,
our bodies can recognize and understand, despite our so-called scientific common sense
and its Cartesian isotropic space, the wisdom embedded in a place, in a culture—its pro-
found, untranslatable expressive qualities. This understanding is made possible particu-
larly by works of art, capable of disclosing places that speak back to us and resonate with
our dreams, opening up the space of desire that allows us to be at home, while remaining
always incomplete and open to our personal death”. [Pe´rez-Go´mez, 2006, 95]
12 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 243]
13 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 145]
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3.1.1 Origin and development of the term
Intentionality is a phenomenological term used by Merleau-Ponty to ex-
press a “directive” engagement with the world.14 However, the term was
originally coined with a slightly different meaning. Franz Brentano resur-
rected the term intentionality into modern philosophy with the following
statement; “every mental phenomenon is characterized by. . . the intentional
inexistence of an object, and what we might call. . . direction toward an ob-
ject”.15 According to Brentano, mental states such as perception, memory,
desire, fear, etc., are all of something, or about something. Dreyfus notes
that, “it is this directedness, or intentionality, Brentano claimed, which
is characteristic of the mind and of nothing else”.16 The particularity of
Brentano’s meaning of intentionality is less significant here, than his pro-
fessorship at the University of Vienna where he taught Edmund Husserl.17
Brentano and Husserl both saw intentionality, “as the mark of the men-
tal”.18 For Brentano and Husserl, who are respectively the forerunners of
this terminology and the discipline of phenomenology, a phenomenon is
strictly a mental directiveness towards something.
Merleau-Ponty then develops intentionality as a concept applicable to
more than just the mental ideas of human minds.19 He claims, “the natural
reference of the stuff to the world leads us to a new conception of inten-
tionality”.20 This “new” mode is an embodied directiveness towards the
world—i.e., bodily intentionality.21
14 [Dreyfus, 1989, 3]
15 [Brentano, 1995, 88] Emphasis my own.
16 [Dreyfus, 1989, 1]
17EdmundHusserl studied under Professor Brentano between the years of 1884 and 1886.
18 [Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2006, 123] and “Husserl developed a detailed account of what
Brentano called the ‘intentionality’ of consciousness, that is to say, its object-directedness,
its of -ness, or ‘aboutness.’ Husserl’s theory of intentionality marks a watershed in the his-
tory of late modern philosophy because, although Brentano was responsible for importing
the term into our technical vocabulary, it was Husserl who effectively put the concept to
work against many of the guiding assumptions that had dominated psychology and the
philosophy of mind since Descartes”. [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 5]
19It should also be noted the Martin Heidegger developed the term prior to Merleau-
Ponty. “In this sense Heidegger is even a more radical phenomenologist than Husserl.
By enlarging and deepening the notion of intentionality from a mere consciousness of
essences into the direction of Dasein as man’s concreate thinking, living, loving and con-
cernful Being-in-the-world, Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s transcendental subjectivism
has increased his faithfulness to Husserl’s phenomenological maxim:‘to the things them-
selves.’ ” [Spiegelberg and Strasser, 1975, 100]
20 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 243] Here “new” is opposed to the Husserlian “classical con-
ception” of intentionality. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 243, 53] In other words, in addition to the
“classical” intentionality, there is Merleau-Ponty’s “new” mode of intentionality.
21 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 53]
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Merleau-Ponty identifies two modes of engaging with the world; bod-
ily intentionality of the thinking body and analytical intentionality of the
thinking mind.22 Dreyfus writes:
To distinguish this body-based intentionality from the representational
intentionality studied by Husserl and Cognitive Science, Merleau-
Ponty calls the body’s response to the affordances of the situation, mo-
tor intentionality.23
Here, the term ‘motor intentionality’, is what I call bodily intentionality,
and is the act of the thinking body.24 Furthermore, bodily intentionality is
the body’s directiveness towards that which is independent of the individ-
ual’s body.
3.1.2 Distinguishing the two modes
Merleau-Ponty employs the famous Schneider case study, which is linked
to Gestalt psychiatrist Goldstein and Gelb as a means of drawing out the
distinctions between bodily and analytical intentionality, Merleau-Ponty
describes the complications of physical movement for a war veteran who
has lost his analytical intentionality but retained his bodily intentionality:
A patient whom traditional psychiatry would class among cases of
psychic blindness is unable to perform ‘abstract’ movements. . . [however]
localization of stimuli, and recognition of objects by touch. . . become
possible with the aid of the preparatory movements. . .one notices
a dissociation of the act of pointing from reactions of taking
or grasping: the same subject who is unable to point to or-
der to a part of his body, quickly moves his hand to the point
where a mosquito is stinging him. Concrete movements and
acts of grasping therefore enjoy a privileged position for which
we need to find some explanation.25
22 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 53]
23 [Dreyfus, , 13]
24To repeat from the introduction, the thinking body is my term for discussing the form
or the factuality, of Merleau-Ponty’s “motor intentionality” [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 110] or
Dreyfus’ terms “motor intentionality” [Carman and Hansen, 2005, 144] and “bodily inten-
tionality” or Sean Kelly’s “motor intentionality” [Wrathall and Malpas, 2000a, 161] David
W. Smith’s term “non-positional consciousness” [Smith and Thomasson, 2005, 273] or J. N.
Mohanty’s “bodily intentionality” [Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2006, 75]
25 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 103] emphasis my own.
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Merleau-Ponty finds this “explanation” with the thinking body.26 In this
case a hand grenade damaged parts of the patient’s body resulting in dis-
abled analytical intentionality to the extent that the patient cannot fulfil
orders which demand him to pause and logically regard the situation from
a detached perspective.27 At the same time, the patient is able to complete
requests situated with an embodied perspective, such as swatting a sting-
ing insect.28 Merleau-Ponty accounts for this discrepancy by distinguing
two modes of intentionality.
Analytical intentionality is the detached reflective engagement with a
situation. The exercise of analytical intentionality effects the individual’s
abstract or theoretical conception of the world. It is a significant occupa-
tion of a human being, but it is not the only one. Bodily intentionality
is the attached, non-reflective engagement with a spatial situation. More-
over, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is the primary means by which spatial
situations emerge.29
Both modes of intentionality distinctly determine particular manifesta-
tions of space. Merleau-Ponty claims that with reflection, there is “geomet-
rical space” and that without reflection there is “physical space”.30 Here
he is claiming that the space we experience while engaging with the world
via the thinking body is physical space. And that physical space is differ-
ent than geometrical space. Skills applied in physical space are in relation
to the task at hand. These skills are without reflection and conducted by
the thinking body. In this mode, space appears unified and understand-
able. Merleau-Ponty explains that, “my body and things, their concrete re-
lationships expressed in such terms as top and bottom, right and left, near
and far, may appear to me as an irreducibly manifold variety”.31 How-
ever, he writes that, upon reflection “I discover a single and indivisible
ability to trace out space”.32 This geometrical and traceable space is sim-
ilar to the “slice or piece of space” that Henri Lefebvre calls architectural
space.33 Space is abstracted and decontextualised from the experience of
living in the world. However, Merleau-Ponty also claims that it is upon
reflection that we realise that the relationships underlying the world “live
only through the medium of a subject who traces out and sustains them”.34
26 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 103]
27Without seeking a more empirical study of the object of the brain, Merleau-Ponty stud-
ies the experience of the patient. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 103].
28 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 103]
29 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 297]
30 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244]
31 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244]
32 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244]
33 [Lefebvre, 1991, 360]
34 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244]
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That space is not “the results of analytical reflection”.35 If geometrical space
is the result of reflective thinking and only exists in the minds of those who
think of it, and that space itself is not the process of reflective thinking, then
these claims raise questions about how the two modes of intentionality re-
late to each other.
relation of the two modes
The two modes of human engagement with space link in an essential fash-
ion. Merleau-Ponty explains that we fundamentally engage with our sur-
roundings via our “experience of the world”.36 This bodily engagement is
the starting point. Upon this, we can “analytically reflect” (via analytical
intentionality) on abstract concepts that do not necessarily exist in our ex-
periential world—e.g. unicorns, or the King of France riding a bicycle, or
the next Frank Gehry project.37 Analytical reflection is the capacity to men-
tally tear apart manifolds of conceptual information. In specific situations
this connection makes possible the mental act which leads to a metaphysi-
cal understanding of the world. Philosophically reflecting upon that which
is fundamentally happening, reveals a necessary “all-embracing synthesis”
of the world.38 In other words the employment of analytical intentional-
ity reveals the act of the thinking body. Similarly, writing about the non-
reflective thinking function of the thinking body is an analytical activity.
As architects are also people who are embodied and embedded within
spatial situations, they employ this connectionwhen designing new spaces.
The spatial and embodied world is the starting point of creativity. Built
upon that, analytical reflection constructs a conceptual web spun with ex-
tracted ideas.39 These ideas amass from individual experiences, cultural
influences—both contemporary and historical—and intuitive understand-
ings of logical and causal connections. In this designs that are constructed
and then occupied by a following generation of architects, work into the
cultural influences of the creative process. Although the design process can
be removed from the physical world, and can reside in ephemeral discus-
sions and sketches, the ideas created are, at least in part, reflections upon
the lived-in space.
35 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 387]
36 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, ix] “Analytical reflection starts from our experience of the world
and goes back to the subject as to a condition of possibility distinct from that experience,
revealing the all-embracing synthesis as that without which there would be no world”.
37 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, ix]
38 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, ix]
39 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, ix]
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Figure 3.1: Working hand drawing
3.2 The fundamental act of the thinking body
Merleau-Ponty’s implicit account of the human experience of space
The act of the thinking body is the intentional drawing from a cloud
of possibilities that renders objects determinate for a finite span of time.
This objectification of indeterminate possibilities is a bodily synthesis which
forms a spatial situation. It is the act of making space.40
Merleau-Ponty most clearly defines this action as follows:
The object which presents itself to the gaze or the touch arouses a
certain motor intention which aims not at the movements of one’s
own body, but at the thing itself from which they are, as it were,
suspended. And in so far as my hand knows hardness and softness,
40Please note, the reasoning for this definition is the focus of this section. As with the
following quotation, the emphasised words are explained in following sub-subsection
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and my gaze knows the moon’s light, it is as a certain way of linking
up with the phenomenon and communicating with it.41
As with the previous definition, the emphasised words are taken up in the
following segments.
the thing itself
That which exists independently of human perception is the “thing it-
self” or the “in-itself”.42 I prefer to use the term ‘in-itself’ because I find
it the least misleading. The in-itself is not something that is turning into
one thingwhen engaged with, but rather the whole collection of all possible
groupings of possibilities, of which the possibilities are made determinate
into one thing.43 The ‘thing itself’ or the ‘in-itelf’ could also be referred to as
“the ipseity of the thing”44 Here ipseity means selfhood, as in the selfhood
of the thing or the thing itself. Merleau-Ponty maintains that engagement
with a situation “is this opening upon a world which makes possible percep-
tual truth” and determinate objects.45 Determinate objects can be under-
stood as objects affording truth qualifications.46 Human engagement with
the in-itself opens a spatial situation composed of determinate objects—
i.e. objects that can be grasped and possessed by humans, e.g. door knobs
and walls. The in-itself is the totality of possibilities of what can be per-
ceived. As such, the in-itself is an indeterminate manifold of potential. The
in-itself is never reached and “each aspect of the thing which falls to our
perception is still only an invitation to perceive beyond it”.47 The in-itself
is the aggregate of possibilities of what can be perceived through the act of
intentionality.
the linking up via bodily intentions, i.e. synthesis
In the act of intentional engagement with the in-itself, the individual deter-
mines perceivable qualities and during the temporal span of this engage-
ment, i.e., synthesises that which is possible into the richness of determinate
41 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 317] Emphases my own.
42 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 317] and [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 294] respectively. Note citation
is for quoted concept only.
43This concept is explained further in the following sub-subsection.
44 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 233]
45 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 297], emphasis my own.
46 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 269]
47 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 233]
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things that exist.48 Merleau-Ponty states this as, “the synthesis of both time
and space is a task that always has to be performed afresh. Our bodily expe-
rience of movement. . . provides us with a way of access to the world and
the object”.49 This means that the active thinking body draws out a collec-
tion of possibilities and solidifies those possibilities into objects composing
a spatial situation for a finite period of time.50 In Merleau-Ponty’s words:
“this passage from the indeterminate to the determinate, this recasting at
every moment of its own history in the unity of a new meaning, is thought
itself”.51 And this is the thought of the thinking body.52 The body “un-
derstands its world” without analytical intentionality while moving and
creating a spatial situation.53 This spatial situation is finite and must be
constantly redefined. Space is not something already there like an “ether”
but is created each time “afresh”, when intentionality engages with the pos-
sibility of it.54 The act of bodily intentionality synthesises the particular
possibilities of what can be, into what is.55
Furthermore, this-space-creating-synthesis is not the “Kantian synthe-
sis” that requires detached reflection.56 Merleau-Ponty argues that this syn-
thesis is a “transition-synthesis” requiring bodily responses to engage with
independent possibilities.57 This is an additional distinction between space
as created by analytical reflection and space as created by bodily engage-
ment. Merleau-Ponty’s theory accounts for both modes of creating space,
yet divides the spaces as lived-in space and thought-about space. Kantian
synthesis creates the “geometrical space” of analytical intentionality; which
is a useful conceptual tool, but is not the space human beings move about
in.58 This is similar to the link between the theories of mathematics and
48 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 233] and [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 140]
49 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 140] Emphasis, my own.
50That is, “it emerges from its liberty of indifference and gives itself a present object”.
[Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 31]
51 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 31]
52Through analytical reflection humans determine cultural systems and orderings.
Through bodily engagement, humans determine spatial systems and orderings. “Every-
thing throws us back on to the organic relations between subject and space, to that gearing
of the subject onto his world which is the origin of space”. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 251]
53 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 251]
54Respectively, [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 140] and “instead of imagining [space] as a sort of
ether in which all things float, or conceiving it abstractly as a characteristic that they have
in common, we must think of it as the universal power enabling them to be connected”.
[Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 243]
55“We withdraw this synthesis from the objective body only to transfer it to the phenom-
enal body, the body, that is, in so far as it projects a certain ‘setting’ round itself”. [Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, 232]
56 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 265]
57 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 265]
58 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 244]
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logic. For example, imaginary numbers can be useful tools for working out
connections between numbers and certain logical rules, however they do
not determine how we live in the world.59
the clouds of possibilities
In employing the metaphor of clouds I am deliberately invoking their
characteristic of indeterminability. I engage with the common notion of
clouds as vague forms of amorphous density and qualities, which change
shape, form, mass and location readily. As people look at the clouds they
serve as gestures to what weather may come. Or, in time of reverie, the
clouds serve as abstract substance upon which the imagination draws fa-
miliarity.
I will note that this characterisation of in-itself as the possibility of that
which is, is only my inference from Merleau-Ponty.60 His project does not
concern the particularities of “the ipseity of the thing”.61 Rather, forMerleau-
Ponty, the in-itself is relevant through the analysis of human engagement
with space, such that the engagement is with something independent of
humans.62 My characterisation of the in-itself as the aggregate of possibil-
ities and the potential object as a cloud of possibilities, in part stems from
the following passage that discusses the ordering of human space as built
on “non-human space”.63 Merleau-Ponty surmises:
Natural and primordial space is not geometrical space, nor, corre-
spondingly, is the unity of experience guaranteed by any universal
thinker arraying its contents before me and ensuring that I possess
complete knowledge of, and exercise complete power over it. It is
59Or how much money we owe our contractors...
60 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 216, 266]
61 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 233] Ipseity meaning selfhood, as in the selfhood of the thing.
Furthermore, concerns of the nature of the selfhood of the thing are perhaps inconsistent
with the practice of phenomenology. See section 1.1.2 for explanation of the aim of phe-
nomenology.
62Moreover, Merleau-Ponty avoids idealism with this metaphysical structure—that our
engagement is with the in-itself, rather than with our perceptions of the thing. “I run
through appearances and reach the real colour or the real shape when my experience is
at its maximum of clarity, in spite of the fact that Berkeley [famed Idealist] may retort that
a fly would see the same object differently or that a stronger microscope would transform
it: these different appearances are for me appearances of a certain true spectacle, that in
which the perceived configuration, for a sufficient degree of clarity, reaches its maximum
richness”. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 318]
63“I never wholly live in varieties of human space, but am always ultimately rooted in a
natural and non-human space”. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 293]
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merely foreshadowed by the horizons of possible objectification,
and it frees me from every particular setting only because it ties me to
the world of nature or the in-itself, which includes all of them.64
The “horizons of possible objectification” is amultitude of possibilities which
afford objectification. Here, I interpret Merleau-Ponty’s use of the word
“objectification” as the act of making an object.65 Metaphorically, the “hori-
zons of possible” can be conceived as clouds of possibilities.66
Together, the clouds of possibilities compose the totality of the in-itself.67
Alone, a cloud of possibilities loans itself to objectification. “Objectifying
acts are not representations”.68 Objectifying acts are the bodily synthesis
of particular clouds of possibilities onto an object—i.e. an object humans
can grasp, such as the door knob or the size of a room. The synthesis oc-
curs as an individual intentionally engages with the cloud of possibilities.69
Merleau-Ponty argues that the objects individuals engage with are never
the entirety its possibilities.70 These clouds of possibilities are the building
blocks for the human world.71
The concept of clouds of possibilities is similar to the concept of an
atom. The physical model that represents an atom assumes two parts, one
of confinement and the other of possibility:
64 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 294]
65 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 294] This is opposed to an early use of the word, meaning to
analytically or reflectively form an object, in, “my body has its world, or understands its
world, without having to make use of my ‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying function”. [Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, 140] I base this interpretation on the context of the text in both locations.
66 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 140]
67Consider from the above quotation ‘. . . the in-itself, which includes all of them.’
68 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 294]
69 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 233]
70 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 216]
71We can grasp the idea of clouds of possibilities by analytical reflection and teasing the
concept out from the whole of that which is possible. I employ the metaphor here of building
blocks to convey the bodily arrangement of space and not the metaphysical make up of the
whole.
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Figure 3.2: J. Boyd Hildebrant’sModel of an Helium Atom
One of the reasons for introducing the concept of clouds of possibilities
is to draw out the issue of confinement and acknowledge that, even in a
metaphysical system centred on human experience, there are limits to what
is possible. The limits are independent from human existence. Relating this
to the concept of style of cultural skills, one’s style effects how the clouds
of possibilities show up and then how the individual person renders and
and transforms the clouds into determinate objects. In other words, via a
style of embodiment, the thinking body engages with the in-itself and from
it makes space and elements.
putting it all together
The composition of a spatial situation occurs when the thinking body syn-
thesis various clouds of possibilities. Consider the human space of aworkshop—
the adequate lighting, noisy tools, flat and solid bench tops, non-offensive
wall coverings, etc. In the workshop I perceive determinate objects and
spaces with fixed qualities. As I engage with the situation, the characteris-
tics of the tools and surfaces vary. In this manner the spatial situationwhich
my thinking body is synthesising, adjusts to the varying demands of my
project—that is, the spaces and elements adjust to my use of them.72 That
is to say that, as I go about working on my model, my embodiment and
72 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 250, 254]
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my engagement with the project create the particularity in which I draw
out possibilities, making clouds of determinant tools and spaces. This is
logically justified because the block of wood I am working with is under-
stood as independent-of-my-perception-of-it, i.e. as a cloud of possibilities.
Merleau-Ponty addresses the make up of the wood as follows:
Every thing appears to us through a medium to which it lends its
own fundamental quality; this piece of wood is neither a collection of
colours and tactile data, not even their total Gestalt, but something
from which there emanates a woody essence [the cloud of possibili-
ties];. . . the natural world [non-human world], is nothing other than
the place of all possible themes and styles.73
The piece of wood I engage with exist independently of me as a cloud
of possibilities. The thinking body first asserts itself in the non-human
world.74 Or, as in the previous example, as I work on my model in the
workshop, my body initially relates to the clouds of possibilities, and sec-
ondly to the forms in which I render those clouds as “verified and full”
blocks of wood, hammers, counter tops, personal space, light from the
overhead fluorescent lights and so on.75 while it is my engagement with
the clouds that form the wood or space, it is not the case that my engage-
ment could have made the hammer a cleaver.76 The wood may grow heav-
ier and stronger as I nail into it, but it will never become a block of marble,
because synthesis is confined to what is, and is not, possible for an indepen-
dent cloud of possibilities. Thus the, cloud of possibilities which is ‘wood’,
cannot be objectified as ‘marble’.77 Merleau-Ponty regards this sovereignty
of the thing and then argues that thinking body’s first asserts itself in the
non-human world..78 That is, “only by projecting me in the first place into
a natural world which can always be discerned underlying the other, as
the canvas underlies the picture and makes it appear unsubstantial”.79 The
thinking body first task is to occupy space within the non-human space of
the possibilities of that which is. This non-human space of indeterminate
possibilities; it is what affords the determinate space of human space. Con-
sidered at an elemental level my bodily habit to reach for the coffee cup
73 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 450]
74 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 293]
75 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 293]
76 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 293]
77 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 297]
78“Prior to and independently of other people, the thing achieves that miracle of expres-
sion: an inner reality which reveals itself externally, a significance which descends into the
world and begins its existence there. . . ” [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 320]
79 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 293]
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(a skill of the thinking body) makes determinate the indeterminate possi-
bilities of the coffee cup.80 It is the when intentionality engages with the
coffee cup, the non-human possibilities of the coffee-cup become “verified
and full”81 or determinate and rich in sensual detail.82
The act of synthesising is not the synthesis of ready-made objects.83
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of this synthesising act is of an active engaging
with the totality of possibilities rather than of ready-made objects. In other
words, it is not the act of walking into a room, and acknowledging the ta-
ble, the light and the rug, and then fusing these objects into the space of
a room. Such a rendering of the phenomenon underestimates the individ-
ual’s influence in the situation. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of bodily
synthesis is not the unification of design elements. For instance, when I
approach a house, I tend to notice the door, the window colours, etc., and
the thinking body’s act of synthesis is not the act of composing these ele-
ments. This would be an example of an analytical act of intentionality. The
thinking body performs the synthesis of sensory information prior to any
analytical reflection of that sensory information. The thinking body synthe-
sises the possibilities of the door, and renders the door in a certain fashion
for my body—e.g. as affording my entrance, welcoming, smooth, heavy,
creaky... and so on.
In contemporary philosophy there is a classic thought experiment that
questions the existence of ‘the tree in Siberia’; if there is no one to see the
tree, does it exist? Some theories lead to claims that the tree would not
be there if no one perceived it.84 Other theories lead to claiming that the
tree is always there, with all the qualities just as they would be if someone
80Merleau-Ponty covers this with an example of the ashtray. “The significance of the
ash-tray. . . is not a certain idea of the ash-tray which co-ordinates its sensory aspects and
is accessible to the understanding alone, it animates the ash-tray, and is self-evidently em-
bodied in it”. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 329]
81 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 329]
82This makes way for an explicit picture of how the thinking body engages with the in-
itself and makes space. Merleau-Ponty maintains that, engagement with a situation “is
this opening upon a world which makes possible perceptual truth” and determinate objects.
[Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 297], emphases my own. Determinate objects can be understand as
objects affording truth qualifications. Human engagement with the in-itself opens a spatial
situation composed of determinate objects—i.e. objects that can be grasped and possessed
by humans.
83“The world around us must be, not a system of objects which we synthesize but a
totality of things, open to us, towards which we project ourselves”. [Merleau-Ponty, 1962,
387]
84Idealism, as in based on Ideas. The most classic Idealist being George Berkeley, who
eventually wiggled his way out of this one by claiming that God sees the tree, so its always
there.
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was perceiving the tree.85 For Merleau-Ponty, the tree would exist as the
cloud of possibilities—indeterminate. And only as someone perceived and
engaged with the tree, would the richness of it sensual qualities become
determinate.86
the architect’s possibilities
Applying Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodied synthesis to the discipline
of architecture results in understanding the designer’s influence over space
as ambiguous, and renders the potential richness of designs as exponen-
tially complex. The architect’s control of the constructed spatial situation
is more ambiguous in comparison to the conventional conception of archi-
tects as installers of a certain experience of a space, and the phenomenolog-
ical qualities of designed space are not determined by the designer. Instead,
the individual’s engagement with the space draws out the richness of ex-
perience. Architecture provides the building blocks with which to make
the space, and the individual’s engagement with the situation provides the
tools. This understanding of what it is to be human entails a perspective
change with regard to architecture’s engagement with its jurisdiction.
Ambiguity here is due to the inevitability that an architect is an em-
bodied being, and as such his thinking body draws on the independent
clouds of possibilities and synthesises the objects and spaces he engages
with. Hence an architect chooses between objects and spaces that he has
made determinate. But these objects and spaces are independent of him,
and hence when he utilises the determinate objects in designs, he is in fact
employing the indeterminate clouds of possibilities rather than the objects
and spaces his bodily intentionality has made determinate. The following
is a series of drawings that picture the relationship between the architect,
clouds of possibilities, objects and users:
85This would be Realism, where people directly perceive objects as brute facts. John
Searle is a famed believer in brute facts.
86It is feasible to argue that should a beetle be on the tree in Siberia, the possibilities of
the tree would be rendered in regards to the beetle’s embodiment. I imagine the qualities
of the beetle’s tree are be very different than the tree I would engage with and that what it
is like to be a beetle is as unimaginable to me, as what it is like to be a bat. However for
further study of this topic see Thomas Nagel’sWhat is it like to be a bat? [Pojman, 2004, 303]
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Figure 3.3: Working hand drawing
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If we compare the idea to the clouds of possibilities, we can then ac-
count for how different people have slightly different understandings of
an object, material, or spatial situation. An architect does not have a privi-
leged relationship with the clouds of possibilities, but has a different style
of embodiment, due to their disposition and training, which can develop
greater understanding of experiential links. For example, architects could
be trained to widen their range of embodiment— for a greater understand-
ing of the effects designs can have on different people. Architects could also
expand the style of their own embodiment — for a greater understanding
of the reach their spatial practices. This would increase architects’ aware-
ness of the causal links that other people employ in experiencing their de-
signs, as the users or other people with other styles and render the space in
accordance with their individual embodiment.87
A brief example. When designing a wall, an architect decides on the
character of the wall as she engages with its determinate qualities. Per-
haps she elects the solid smooth finish of stained concrete, a tall arch and
an absence of edging details with the floor and the ceiling. Analytically,
the architect engages with the wall as a solid division of private spaces
and a smooth surface that avoids the collection of dust and signs of wear.
However, the wall that is constructed is more than the summation of the
qualities that the architect analytically understands, because the wall exists
independently as a cloud of possibilities. Hence when different users of the
design engage with the wall, different experiences of the physical qualities
of the wall become determinate. For example, the experience of a softness
associated with the smoothness, or an entrapment associated with the use
of concrete in prisons, or a banality or familiarity coming from the height,
or a loudness coming from the hard surface, or a coldness coming from the
absorbent nature of concrete or a coolness or a heaviness and helplessness
coming from the strength of the wall. Additionally, and perhaps more in-
terestingly, less psychological qualities of the wall may become manifest;
such as, the more physical properties of height, colour, temperature. Ryo
Hatano describes his experience of a concrete wall designed by Kiyoshi
Takeyama for the D-Hotel in Osaka in yet another light. He writes:
The fair-faced concrete which forms huge wall which drew the arc gen-
tly serves as an overwhelming lump, and a feeling of coercion is given
to what is seen. Isn’t that because it is demonstrated in order that
weightiness, density, etc. which concrete has may resist the maximum
to a city?88
87Further analysis of this concept is carried out in the fifth chapter.
88 [Tak, , -]
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The various styles in which the individual thinking body engages with the
wall contributes to the overall composition of the space and influences an
individual’s overall experience of the space. While the system of embodi-
ment does afford cultural influences, rendering space is not simply amatter
of psychological associations or memories. The metaphysical structure of
the thinking body engaging with independent possibilities proposes a rad-
ically different view compared with the more dominant Cartesian or the
“post-Galilean view, which conceives of the physical body as a machine
and as a subject of mechanical laws”.89
3.3 Conclusion
In the act of embodied being the individual synthesises particular possibili-
ties and draws out from that-which-could-be—the cloud of possibilities—a
unified system of that-which-is-experienced or that-which-I-percieve-my-
world-to-be. The intentionality of reflection composes theworld of thoughts
— dreams, futures, art, politics, logic, and impossibilities such as unicorns
“from which the great poetry of our world is ma[d]e up”.90 The intention-
ality of the thinking body arranges the physical space and manifests the ar-
chitectural qualities that surround it — the heat of a fire place, the strength
of a wall, the size of a window, the desirability of a doorway, the darkness
of a hallway, the softness of driftwood, or the brittleness of a brick wall.
These elements of theworld are not solely constructed by the individual
because they are working with the materials of that-which-is-independent
of the perceiver. Or, as Merleau-Ponty explains: “prior to and indepen-
dently of other people, the thing achieves that miracle of expression”.91
This claim asserts an understanding of the actions of the human body as
creating the space in which it exists from the independent and thereby in-
determinate clouds of possibilities. The architect’s responciblity is to act on
those possibilities.
The phenomenon that Merleau-Ponty is reaching for is the fundamen-
tal metaphysical act of being. He regards ideas as having “philosophical
value” only when they are able to “teach us anything concerning the struc-
ture itself of consciousness”. To not have philosophical value is to “present
us merely with contents of human experience”.92 Merleau-Ponty seeks to
89 [Imrie, 2003, 47]
90 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 321]
91 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 320]
92 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 288]
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understand how it is that I find this world as such, with its warm, solid,
grey ground, and a feeling that there is a past to my life and this space,
within which I, myself, decide to walk, that I know the ground will sup-
port my mass, or that I can observe causal connections and interject within
their processes. He questions how it is that I have come to be here and now,
and in a situation that seems slightly different, but not altogether conflict-
ing with the experience relayed by another.
A fundamental act of synthesis is at the centre of Merleau-Ponty’s ex-
planation of how ‘I’ come to find myself in a world rich in spatial possi-
blitities.93 This act is the employment of intentionality, and intentionality
is always directed at something. To understand the phenomenon of syn-
thesis more easily, Merleau-Ponty introduces two modes of intentionality:
one that is performed by the body, and one that is executed by the mind.
The main difference between these intentionalities is the act of reflection.
The bodily intentionality does not abstract the decision from the flow of
engagement with a situation. However, analytical intentionality halts en-
gagement with a situation to reflect and make decisions. The occupation of
both intentionalities is the act of drawing out particular possibilities and so-
lidifying those elements for finite periods of time. This is the act of making
space.
93 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 387] Again this is not the detached Kantian synthesis, but rather
is an embodied synthesis.
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Chapter 4
An Enquiry into a Prior
Translation of Merleau-Ponty’s
Philosophy into Architectural
Theory
In contemplating the value of phenomenology for architecture I have come
to believe that it can provide a framework that connects and strengthens the
architect’s intuitive approach to human experience of space, with the theo-
rist’s more reflective or critical approach. As phenomenology is embedded
within the discipline and history of philosophy, its readers are required to
employ particular methods and assumptions.The challenges of these par-
ticularities often lead to misinterpretations of primary philosophical text.
In this chapter I argue that Juhani Pallasmaa’s theoretical undertaking to
expose architects to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of space fails to incor-
porate the philosophy’s key premises.1
If architecture is to benefit from the phenomenological research ofMerleau-
Ponty then a logical starting point is to clarify how the leading architec-
1My critique of Pallasmaa’s theory is limited to his account of the human experience of
space, in particular his rendering of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. As an aside, I acknowl-
edge that Pallasmaa is an accomplished and “esteemed” architectural writer and critic, and
has been praised by Timo Kiukkolar as, “Juhani Pallasmaa is a phenomenon!”. [MacKeith,
2006, 8, 11] Respectively.
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tural Merleau-Ponty theorist, Juhani Pallasmaa, translates philosophy.2 As
examined in chapter one, Pallasmaa critiques contemporary architecture
as being retinal-centric. Pallasmaa’s reasoning for seeking a new design
criteria is based on an analysis of architecture as inadequately engaging
with the human body. Pallasmaa’s critique of architecture is positioned
in line with the other theorists surveyed in my first chapter; i.e., Christian
Norberg-Schulz, Rob Imrie, Alberto Pe´rez-Go´mez, Vittorio Gregotti, Eliza-
beth Grosz, Henri Lefebvre and David Krell.3 In response to this critique,
Pallasmaa proposes a new design criteria described as a phenomenology of
architecture.4 He successfully offers architecture an initial gesture towards
Merleau-Ponty.5 However, in this chapter I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s and
Pallasmaa’s structures of the human experience of space are incompatible.
Herein lies the problem; architecture merits an accurate rendering of
Merleau-Ponty’s theory, Pallasmaa claims to provide it, yet his account fails
to incorporate Merleau-Ponty’s key concept of a non-reflective intentional
body that engages with indeterminate possibilities, to make determinate
spatial situations. In other words, Pallasmaa’s theory ignores the thinking
body and works with an account of human spatial experience that is in-
compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s. Pallasmaa’s interpretation leads to a su-
perficial set of phenomenological design criteria that promote an architec-
tural engagement with the senses of the human body, rather than Merleau-
Ponty’s thinking body.6
2 [MacKeith, 2006, 92] Additionally, Juhani Pallasmaa’s career ranges from practitioner,
lecturer, writer to theorist. [MacKeith, 2006, 8] In the publisher’s note to a collection of
essays celibrating Pallasmaa’s 70th Birthday, Gunnel Adlercreutz notes “he has received
innumerable prizes and awards for excellence in architectural design and in architectural
criticism.” He trained in the technical field of architecture in the mid-1950s and began pub-
lishing essays in the late 1960s [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 11]. In the 1970s, a trip to Ethiopia “disil-
lusioned” Pallasmaa’s “faith and confidence in rationality”. [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 17]. He has
since examined other fields to provide support for a new architectural theory [Pallasmaa,
2005a, 18]. His 1996 book, The Eyes of the Skin established Pallasmaa as a leading Architec-
tural theorist of Merleau-Ponty and has sought to emphasis the metaphysical experience of
space and architecture. [MacKeith, 2006, 220]
3 [Pallasmaa, 2000, 2], [Pallasmaa, 1994, 16] Refer to sub-section 1.1.1 for further analysis.
4 [Pe´rez-Go´mez and Parcell, 2004, 143]
5 [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 59], [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 4], [Pallasmaa, 2000, 2], [Pallasmaa, 1996, 31]
and 1999 article, Lived Space [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 129]. Additionally, Pallasmaa introduces
some of Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, i.e. the “flesh” [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 5], [Pallasmaa,
2005a, 59] and “body scheme” [Pallasmaa, 1991, 46] In Merleau-Ponty’s final incomplete
work The Visible and the Invisible, he intrudes an understanding of the totality of that which
exist and dubs it the flesh.
6 [Pallasmaa, 2000, 85]
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4.1 Exhibiting Pallasmaa’s view
For comparison, consider the follow two essences of how human bodies
experience space:
Merleau-Ponty’s implicit structure:
(BODILY INTENTIONALITY)(SYNTHESISES)(CLOUDS OF POSSIBIL-
ITIES)
Pallasmaa’s structure:
(A MODE OF ANALYTICAL INTENTIONALITY)(SYNTHESISES)(COLLECTION
OF SENSE EXPERIENCES)
These two accounts of the human experience of space are incompatible.
This is in part due to Pallasmaa’s failure to distinguish the two modes of
intentionality. Without this distinction, Pallasmaa works only with a mud-
dled version of analytical intentionality and some lingering notion of the
subconscious. In this section I argue that, for Pallasmaa, the experience of
space occurs by the act of analytical intentionality synthesising the collec-
tive experiences of the senses.
Figure 4.1: Steven Spielberg,Minority Report, 2002
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4.1.1 Muddled; the two modes of intentionality
Merleau-Ponty’s account distinguishes twomodes of intentionality inwhich
human beings engage with their surroundings.7 This distinction is nec-
essary to reach Merleau-Ponty’s rendering of human experience. Pallas-
maa’s writings reveal a confusion between these two modes of intention-
ality. Sometimes Pallasmaa accounts for the experience of space with the
notion of the imagination or a consciousness, as in this example of the night-
scape of a city:
One who has half-risen to the sound of a distant train at night and
through this sleep, experienced the space of the city with its count-
less inhabitants scattered around its structures, knows the power of
sound to the imagination; the nocturnal whistle of a train makes one
conscious of the entire sleeping city.8
At other times, Pallasmaa uses the termmind to engage with the experience
of space. Writing:
We need an architecture that does not aspire after the dramatic, but
rather aims at lyricising the real things of everyday life. We yearn for
radical ordinariness and mundanely, a natural architecture of the type
that fills our minds with good feelings when we enter an old peasant
cottage or sit upon a Shaker chair.9
Moreover, the poetry of Pallasmaa’s writing style can lend itself to under-
standing the mind as a non-reflective intentionality such that, in the pas-
sage, the mind feels good by means of how it engages with the peasant
cottage.10 This passage can, however, equally lead to understanding the
mind as a faulty that reflects to itself ‘this feels good’.
We are again confronted with the indistinction between mind and body
perceiving the world in the following excerpt, where Pallasmaa expresses
the phenomenological quality of the interwoven existence of a person and
space:
7The analytical intentionality of the mind and the bodily intentionality of the thinking
body.
8 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 30]Emphasis my own.
9 [Pallasmaa, 1991, 3]
10 [Pallasmaa, 1991, 3]
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Place and event, space and mind, mutually define each other and fuse
inevitably into a singular experience. The mind perceives the world
and the world exists through experience. Experiencing a space or a
house is a dialogue, a kind of exchange: I place myself in the space and
the space settles in me.11
This passage draws on the phenomenological notion that an individual cre-
ates the space around himself and the space around him influences that
process of generation. Pallasmaa incorporates the “mind” into the expe-
rience of space at the fundamental level of being-in-the-world.12 In Pal-
lasmaa’s account, the mind acts as fuser of individual’s experiences of the
world and the world engages with the individual through a set of sensory
experiences affecting the mind. In other words, analytical intentionality is
used to synthesise a collection of sense experiences.
Pallasmaa identifies good architecture as what he calls “life-enhancing”
architecture, he claims that it must address the “senses” and that the archi-
tect must “fuse our image of self with our experience of the world.”13 In
this account, architecture is the actor that fuses a self image with an expe-
rience of the space. Moreover, this entails that the image of the self con-
tributes to the experience of the space. The image of self appears again as
Pallasmaa discusses the phenomenological thesis of being-in-the-world:14
Architecture articulates the experiences of being-in-the-world and strength-
ens our sense of reality and self; it does not make us inhabit worlds
of mere fabrication and fantasy.15
Whether or not this is analytical reflection remains unclear, but it is cer-
tain that there is no argument being made for a phenomenological, non-
reflective, bodily intentionality.
Deficiencies in Pallasmaa’s philosophical understanding additionally
surface when he endeavours to phenomenologically describe the experi-
ence of space:
11 [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 61]
12 [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 61]
13 [Pallasmaa, 2006, 2] “It is evident that ‘life-enhancing’ architecture has to address all
the senses simultaneously and fuse our image of self with our experience of the world.”
14As noted perviously, I have chosen to avoid philosophical jargon throughout this thesis.
The phrase being-in-the-world here is due to Pallasmaa’s use of it. I have used words such
as engaging with space or a spatial situation.
15 [Pallasmaa, 2006, 2] Emphasis my own.
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I can say that for me the strongest experience of a warm, intimate and
protective interior space is the sight of a house with lit windows in the
evening dusk of a snow-covered landscape. This is space experienced
through the cells of the skin.16
Pallasmaa’s characterisation renders the cells of the skin as something that
feel and receive but do not influence the space. Underlying this depiction
is the assumption of the separation between observer and world, of which
the skin is the boundary. Merleau-Ponty would interpret the experience as
manifesting the intentionality of the thinking body. Contrarily, Pallasmaa
suggests the experience takes root in a manifold of sensory parts—one of
which is skin cells. Likewise, in the following passage, the feeling on the
skin must be “recognize[d]” by the “I” to be felt:17
The details of the roofs or hearths of the familiar buildings of my child-
hood have escaped from my memory, but I still recognize the plea-
sure on my skin when hearing the beating of rain under a sheltering
roof. . . 18
Figure 4.2: Gustav Klimt’s Pine Forest (Forest of Firs I) (1902)
16 [Pallasmaa, 1991, 45]
17 [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 92]
18 [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 92] Emphasis my own.
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In the following passage I attempt to provide a first-person description
draws attention to the difference between Pallasmaa’s andMerleau-Ponty’s
account, by emphasising different aspects of the experience of approaching
a cabin in the woods.19 In this depiction bodily intentionality, and analyti-
cal intentionality, are differentiated and the act of recognition plays no role
in the bodily engagement which determines the spatial situation.20 This is
an experience where the familiarity of past moments are irretrievably in-
tertwined with a current physical state:
A state of well worked limbs, an active heart rate, a raised body
temperature, the isolation of wondering about the dappledmoon
light through still life stretching upright far past my reach, and
as I come to identify the amber light, as someone that can talk
with me and I quietly pause to take in the new possibilities, and
the warmth gained by my movement dissipates into the night’s
air, it’s become clear that a choice needs to be made and I find
myself standing on the cusp of the woods staring at a strangers
window, cool from the indecision of my thinking body that for-
warded the options to my reflective, analytical intentionality.
The consciousness of the thinking body guided the individual
through the woods, rendered the night sky clear, the trees tall,
weaved the body through their girth, and brought me to pause
at the edge. It is also what alerted my analytical intentionality
to the situation of choosing to engage with whomever may be
awaiting my appearance in that isolated cabin.21
Comparing the two style of phenomenological description reveals that
Pallasmaa does not distinguish between modes of intentionality. Pallas-
maa’s description postulates a separate entity that is called the “cells of the
skin” which take in an emotional situation, but does not effect how that
situation is perceived.22 The lack of distinction between the thinking body
and the thinking mind leads Pallasmaa to claim that it is an act of the mind
perceiving the world that creates the experience of space.
19 [Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 153]
20Description, my own.
21Description, my own.
22 [Pallasmaa, 1991, 45]
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Figure 4.3: Vittore Grubicy De Dragon,Winter (Inverno), 1898
4.1.2 The matter of the sub-conscious
Lingering in Pallasmaa’s metaphysics are notions of the “subconscious”
and “unconscious”.23 This leads to further ambiguities when rendering
the phenomenon of experiencing space. Importantly, Merleau-Ponty ex-
plicitly rejects the concept of the sub- or unconscious because it assumes a
bracketing-off of human experiences, that, in turn, postulates the existence
of experience that are as inaccessible to the human experience of them, i.e.
experiences that are in-experience-able. Pallasmaa evokes the imagery of
an unconscious experience in writing: “Touch is the unconsciousness of
vision. . . ”24 He portrays the tactile qualities of an object being “uncon-
sciously” perceived through vision. His observation of the phenomenon
are in accord with Merleau-Ponty’s account of cross-sensory experience,
i.e. “synaesthetic perception”.25 However, Pallasmaa’s account diverge be-
cause the individual lacks accessibility to the experience and participation
of the body.
23 [Pallasmaa, 2007, 7], [Pallasmaa, 1994, 4], Receptively.
24 [Pallasmaa, 2005b, 10]
25 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 229]
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In another passage Pallasmaa additionally falls short of classifying the
phenomena:
In environmental experience there is an unconscious bodily identi-
fication with the object, a projection of the body scheme onto what is
experienced, or a physical mimesis, an unconscious mimicry.26
Merleau-Ponty does employ the notion of a “bodily scheme” or “body im-
age” as an element of embodiment, of particular relevance to basic general
skills.27 The body scheme is how the thinking body conceives itself.28 If
I engage with spatial situations with a walking cane, or eyeglasses, then
my thinking body will account for these tools as part of my body; thereby
the body scheme is the physical body and the tools that are intimately em-
ployed when engrossed with the world.29
In recent Merleau-Ponty scholarship the issue of Mirror Neurones has
become popular.30 Mirror Neurones were discovered by the “Italian neuro-
physiologist, Giacomma Rizzo-latti [who] found that certain cells in mon-
key frontal lobes respond to specific actions not only in the subject, but also
when the subject observes another perform that same action”.31 This is an
instance where scientific neurological research supports Merleau-Ponty’s
observations of the phenomena regarding the thinking body’s reaction to
people. However, this mimicry is an exchange between two living beings
and acted out by the thinking body. Pallasmaa’s proposition confuses two
separate elements of scholarship of Merleau-Ponty theory; that is how the
body sees itself through embodiment (i.e. body scheme), and how the body
learns through other living beings (i.e. motor neurones).
In the above passage addressing “unconscious mimicry”, Pallasmaa
again advances the notion of the unconscious which Merleau-Ponty’s ren-
dering of human consciousness does not afford.32 Postulating a subcon-
scious entails a stream of reflective and detached judgements that the indi-
vidual has no access to, but none-the-less effects the individual. Contrarily,
phenomenology is the study of experience with the maxim; do not create
back stories of how things work because looking at the experience itself
26 [Pallasmaa, 1991, 46]
27 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 48] and [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 98, 141] Respectively. Please note,
I cover these concepts in chapter 2 with the framework of Embodiment; see section 2.2.
28 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 140]
29 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 143] and [Lacan, 1991, 51]
30 [Freeman, 1991, 1] and [Noland, 2007, 29]
31 [Goguen, , 2]
32 [Pallasmaa, 1991, 46]
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provides enough richness for explanation.33 This hinges on the notion that
the sub-conscious is not experience-able, but the thinking body is. While
in the flow of engaging with a situation, an individual might not be saying
to himself—wow, I’m really cooking now—but the individual still experi-
ences the act of engaging with the situation and has access to that experi-
ence. Even if that access is bodily and not reflective, there is still access.
Merleau-Ponty summarises this as: “Consciousness is neither the posit-
ing of oneself, nor ignorance of oneself, it is not concealed from itself. . . ”
meaning that no elements of consciousness are inaccessible to the individ-
ual experiencing them.34 Merleau-Ponty writes: “In this sense there is no
unconscious.”35 In this way he rejects the characterisation of unconscious
concept.
Philosophical theorist David Pettigrew claims that this “ ‘de-entification’
of the unconscious. . . evokes amotif that lies at the heart ofMerleau-Ponty’s
project”.36 Dismissing the unconscious and establishing the thinking body
works symbiotically; weighting the emphasis on the negative argument
however, neglects Merleau-Ponty’s project of phenomenologically study-
ing the experience of the body to find out “anything concerning the struc-
ture itself of consciousness”.37 Merleau-Ponty’s aims at demonstrating struc-
tures rather than demolishing obsolete ideas.
Because Pallasmaa fails to distinguish the two modes of intentionality
he only works with a vague notion of analytical intentionality. For him, the
experience of being in space requires a reflective and mindful synthesising
faculty rather than a bodily synthesising faculty. This interpretation of the
phenomenon also ignores the participatory aspect of the thinking body. For
Pallasmaa, the human being takes in sensory data, synthesises that data,
and creates the experience of space. For Merleau-Ponty, the thinking body
intentionally draws from clouds of possibilities to render objects determinate
for a finite span of time. In Merleau-Ponty’s theory, the act objectifies in-
determinate possibilities; the body draws out from that which could be, to
make that which is, making a rich and solid spatial situation while it goes
about its way.38
33 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 243]
34 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 296]
35 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 296]
36 [Olkowski and Morley, 1999, 58]
37 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 288]
38See section 3.3 for further discussion.
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4.2 Collection of sense experiences
The strategic importance of these different accounts emerges when project-
ing their implications for designed space. Pallasmaa points to an architec-
ture that prioritises sensory experiences synthesised by the mind. The de-
sign focus of Merleau-Ponty leads the architect to consider the continuous
process of creating spatial situations through the interaction of the thinking
body and that-which-is-independent-of-it. One account shifts the design
emphasis from catering to the eye, to catering to the five senses, while the
other radically alters the structure of the conventional mind/ body hierar-
chy.39
Figure 4.4: Gustav Klimt, Beech Forest (1903)
The weight of his proposition leans on the collaboration of the eye with
the body. He claims architecture is the continuation of the healing nature
of the forest, into the urban realm; and therefore the multi-sensory quali-
ties of the forest should be regenerated in design. He additionally asserts
the priority of the senses with the claim, “every touching experience of
architecture is multi-sensory: qualities of space are measured equally by
39 [Pe´rez-Go´mez and Parcell, 2004, 158], [Pallasmaa, 1996, 24] “A walk through a forest
is invigorating and healing due to the interaction of all sense modalities. . . The eye collabo-
rates with the body and the other senses. One’s sense of reality is strengthened and articu-
lated by this interaction of the senses. Architecture is essentially an extension of nature into
the man-made realm. . . ” [Pallasmaa, 1996, 28]
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the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin, and muscles”.40 Pallasmaa’s theory un-
derstands the engagement of the body with space as an intermingling of
the sensory faculties. While this is an adequate retort to his critique that,
“architecture has distanced itself from other-sense realms and become a
purely retinal artform”, it is not a reasonable insight to gain from Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological theory.41 Finally, when Pallasmaa questions the
metaphysical state of experiencing space and the architectural means for
harmonising with it, he asks:
The art of architecture is engaged with metaphysical and existential
questions concerning man’s being-in-the-world. . . The task of archi-
tecture is to make visible how the world touches us, as Merleau-Ponty
said of the paintings of Paul Ce´zanne.42
He provides his own answer ten years later in a retrospective article writ-
ing:43
With the title The Eyes of the Skin, I wished to express the significance
of the tactile sense for our experience and understanding of the world,
but I also intended to create a conceptual short circuit between the
dominant sense of vision and the suppressed sense modality of touch.
Since writing the original text I have learned that our skin is actually
capable of distinguishing a number of colors; we do indeed see by our
skin.44
We can conclude that Pallasmaa has accomplished an introduction of phe-
nomenology to architecture. Yet, metaphorically speaking, he has intro-
duced the new party guest with the correct name, but the wrong pronunci-
ation. That is, when Pallasmaa employsMerleau-Ponty’s research to justify
his new design criteria for architecture, he gives a false impression of ade-
quately providing architecture with a translation of Merleau-Ponty’s phe-
nomenology of the human experience of space.
40 [Pe´rez-Go´mez and Parcell, 2004, 158]
41 [Pallasmaa, 1994, 16]
42 [Pallasmaa, 1996, 31] Analysis is devoted to the implications of this association between
Ce´zanne’s paintings and the possibilities of architecture in the conclusion. See section 6.4
for consideration of architecture as art.
43Ten years later, Pallasmaa review his earlier work in an article titled: Eyes of the Skin:
Architecture and the senses [Pallasmaa, 2006, 1]
44 [Pallasmaa, 2006, 2]
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4.3 Conclusion
Pallasmaa identifies a deficiency in contemporary architecture’s ability to
create spaces that appeal to senses other than the eye. He suggests that
architecture is retinal-centric. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s research, Pal-
lasmaa asserts that the experience of space, is more than the viewing of
space, but clings to the need for an ‘I’. Pallasmaa’s understanding of the
experience of space postulates a central processing faculty to organise the
five forms of sensory experience. He refers to this synthesising faculty as
the “mind” or the “image of self”.45 By necessitating a faculty for reflective
thought for the experiencing of space, Pallasmaa stands in immediate op-
position to Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning that the human experience of space
is non-reflective being-in-the-world; that is, the continuous engagement
of the thinking body. In other words, rather than fundamentally altering
the conventional architectural understanding of human experience, Pallas-
maa’s account merely shifts the design emphasis from catering to the eye
to catering to the five senses, while maintaining the dominance of the mind
over the body.
45 [Pallasmaa, 2005a, 61] and [Pallasmaa, 2006, 2], respectively.
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Chapter 5
The Thinking Body in Built
Architecture
In the preceding chapter I argued that designing for the phenomenological
body is not just about catering to the senses. This is because the body is
capable of a non-reflective synthesis of sensory information, before the in-
formation engages the analytical intentionalities of the mind. In this chap-
ter I explain what it might mean to design architecture that is sympathetic
to the thinking body. I illustrate with a pair of contextual design solutions
catering to the thinking body by studying three architectural volumes. I ex-
amine the architectural volumes of the entrance, a corridor and thewindow
in three buildings by Carlo Scarpa. Scarpa’s work is especially relevant due
to the quality George Dodd’s described as, “not about the body-as-object or
the body-as-other; it is about how our bodies, not simply as sensing organs
or viewing devices, but as sentient being fully engage in culturally specific
constructs”.1 Of the many constructions Scarpa completed I will consider
the corridor space of the Castelvecchio Museum, an interior room of the
Museo Canoviano, and the entrance space of the Querini Stampalia Foun-
dation.
The contextual design solutions are drawn together frommy prior anal-
ysis of Merleau-Ponty’s implicit structure of the human body’s experience
of spatial situations. Through that analysis I concluded that there exists
an intentional bodily flow of movement in space and a synthesis of pos-
sibilities into determinate objects. Taking these findings I propose that by
1 [Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, 256]
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providing spatial affordances and veritable causal connections architects can
forge ways towards catering for the thinking body.
In this chapter I first account for not simply taking the conclusions
from the previous chapters to critique how well built examples manifest
Merleau-Ponty’s theory. I proceed describe why I chose to study the work
of Carlo Scarpa. I go onto to introduce the pair of contextual design solu-
tions by examining three constructed volumes. Each of the volumes could
be employed to demonstrate both design solutions. However for clarity,
my structure for examining the architectural spaces is tripartide. I pair my
discussion of the corridor with the solution of spatial affordances. I pair
the interior room with my concept of veritable causal connection. Finally,
I further bring out the ramifications of designing veritable causal connec-
tions by explaining what not to do, through pairing the entrance with the
new concepts of object fac¸adism and analytical exercises.
5.1 Why not a pure critique of a phenomenological ar-
chitect?
The American architect Steven Holl comes closest to the label of ‘phenome-
nologist architect’. Holl’s architecture has been noted as, “fundamentally. . . about
phenomenology” as early as 1989.2 Or as plainly as Arthur Danto’s de-
scription of, “Holl’s architectural philosophy derives from the phenomeno-
logical writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, especially as set forth in Phe-
nomenology of Perception”.3 The phenomenological theme in Holl’s work
is particularly evident in his collaboration with Juhani Pallasmaa and Al-
berto Pe´rez-Go´mez, writing, Question of Perception.4 In this publication,
Holl references Merleau-Ponty and claims that the underlying question
of architectural perception is intentionality.5 Merleau-Ponty’s influence is
also evident as Holl writes of a “consciousness of perception” and a “sen-
sitized consciousness”.6 However, his analysis concludes that intentions
are the non-real existences of mental phenomena.7 Given that Holl refer-
ences Merleau-Ponty as he employs the term ‘intentionality’, the disjunct
2Kevin Lippert writes, “fundamentally, however, Holl’s architecture is about phe-
nomenology”. [Holl, 1989, 9]
3Arthur C Danto [Danto, 2008, 123]
4 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, -] and [Danto, 2008, 124]
5 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 41]
6 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 40] and correlating with the conclusion found in [Danto, 2008,
124]
7 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 42]
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between Merleau-Ponty’s and Holl’s use of the term is significant. My pre-
vious study of the term intentionality suggest intentionality is a real and
directed engagement with the world that is further divided into a bodily
engagement and reflective analyses.8 Therefore, for Holl to explain inten-
tionality as non-real mental phenomena, is not only nonsensical (because
how is it possible to have a non-real phenomenon?), but misses the point
of Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to the study of the human body.
Holl further reveals a misinterpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s words by
attributing the motivation of an “intellectual and spiritual” seeking of un-
derstanding spatial entities, to a “duality of intention and phenomena”.
A duality that Holl claims, is “like the interplay between objective and
subjective or, more simply, thought and feeling”.9 Here, intentions are
equated to the “objective” and then to “thought”.10 In contrast, Holl re-
lates “phenomena” to the “subjective” and then to “feelings”.11 It is fruitful
to distinguish the philosophical use of the words subjective and objective.
“Subjective” cannot be merely equated with “feelings”, rather it refers to
that-which-is unique to an individual; i.e. an individual’s perspectives,
feelings, thoughts, experiences and so on.12 Likewise, “objective” cannot
be transcribed as “thought”, rather it refers to that which is universal and
something that is not subject to an individual; i.e. logic, generalisations,
principles.13 It is common for philosophical terms to develop new mean-
ings in everyday language, however, when analysing philosophical ideas,
it is necessary to determine the meaning of the employed terms. Hence,
for Holl to link intentionality to objectiveness and then to thought, over-
simplifies and obscures the force of Merleau-Ponty’s argument. As Holl
referencesMerleau-Ponty and discusses “consciousness of perception” and
“intentionality”, he abstracts word’s without displaying an understanding
of the word’s context and thereby the position they occupy in Merleau-
Ponty’s overall composition of how human beings exist in space.14 There-
fore, Holl postulates illogical concepts such as, intentions are non-real ex-
istences. And his readers potentially miss out on the more innovative
arguments by taking the misinterpretations as representative of Merleau-
Ponty’s theory. Holl’s review of Merleau-Ponty echoes the “classic image
of the architect as using knowledge from many other disciplines without
becoming an expert in any of them. (Vitruvius 1960, 5-11)”15
8 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 53] also see section 3.1 for detailed analyses.
9 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 42]
10 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 42]
11 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 42]
12 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 42] and [OED, 2008, -] and [SEo, , -]
13 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 42] and [OED, 2008, -] and [SEo, , -]
14 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 41, 42]
15 [Piotrowski and Robinson, 2001, 5-11] Essay by David JT Vanderburgh and W Russell
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Despite this misunderstanding Holl later states that: “many of the ideas
are positions that we can continue to work from today, but I also have my
doubts. As soon as you make a statement, you want to transcend it”.16
Therefore it is no surprise that Holl’s work is less concerned with mani-
festing phenomenological architecture and more concerned with what he
defines as “perceptual phenomena”; i.e. “touch, smell, sight, etc”.17 In par-
ticular, his architectural works are predominately concerned with the use
of light as a building material for making space.18
Figure 5.1: Steven Holl, Drawing Shadows, Oxnard, CA 1986
Holl’s interest in light, or in this case “shadow as the ‘material’ for the
spatial sequence” is even anticipated in the 1994 collaboration where his
drawing emphasis the play of light and shadow in a space.19
Ellis, quotation discussing Vitruvius image of the tactless architect who conducts cross-
disciplinary visits.
16 [Holl and Futagawa, 1996, 33]
17 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 43]
18 [Gannon, 2004, 17,18] and [Kipnis, 2007, 37] and [Holl et al., 1997, 82] and [Holl, 1996, 7]
19 [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, 67]
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5.2 Illustration of design solutions through architec-
tural volumes
There are awealth of architects to consider when selecting architectural vol-
umes to illustrate my findings. Tadao Ando, Friedensreich Hundertwasser,
and Carlo Scarpa quickly come to mind. Ironically, none of these men stud-
ied architecture at university.20 Still, an enduring quality of understanding
human engagement with space is evident in their works.
Figure 5.2: Tadao Ando, Galleria Akka, Osaka Japan, 1988
Architectural critique RyoHatano´ describes TadaoAndo’s Galleria Akka
as:
Soft light which a ceiling part rubs against the well space of this con-
struction. . . brings composure to internal space composition with high
activity. Consequently, it has made from appearance space with the
sufficient feeling which is hard to imagine.21
20For Ando [Tadao Ando, 2008, 514] and [Buck, 2000, 156], for Hundertwasser [Johnson,
1994, 179] and [Salingaros and Alexander, 2004, 7], and lastly for Scarpa [Zambonini, 1983,
22]
21 [Hatano, 2008, -]
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Figure 5.3: Friedensreich Hundertwasser, Maishima Sludge Centre, Osaka
1996-2003
Figure 5.4: Friedensreich Hundertwasser, The houses are hanging underneath
the meadows, 1971
Along side this painting, Hundertwasser writes the poem:
The roofs must become WOODLANDS
The Streets must become GREEN VALLEYS
The traffic should pass under ARCADES 22
Other architects, such as Peter Zumthor, Steven Holl, Sey Takeyama,
and Terunobu Fujimori, all play influential roles in the contemporary prac-
tice of phenomenological architecture and could be studied in detail.23 But
22 [Hundertwasser, 1973, 48]
23 [Zumthor, 2006, -], [Pallasmaa et al., 2006, -], [AaP, 2009, -]
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of course, a selection needs to be made to simplify my demonstration, and
I have limited my study to Carlo Scarpa.
Scarpa’s works portray considerable attention to detail, dedication to
projects and an ability to produce particular embodied experiences. George
Dodds comments that Scarpa’s designs move the body in such ways as to
blur the line between an individual body and spatial situations:
Body, landscape, and physical movement often combine in Scarpa’s
work to produce moments. . . [that] obscures the distinction between
bodies and landscape. . . 24
Dodds’ comment reinforces my claim of the attention Scarpa grants to the
experience of the body, although I do not find that Merleau-Ponty’s struc-
ture of human spatial experience justifies a design solution of merging
body with space or “figure and surrounding”.25 Along these lines, Bianca
Albertini affirms this experiential attunement, stating “it seems to me that
Scarpa has fully achieved this level of authenticity, in every detail”.26 The
“authenticity” Albertini refers to is that of Christian Norberg-Schulz’s aim,
“ ‘to make architecture. . .human in the real sense of the word.’ ”27 This
quality of design is achieved alongside Scarpa’s attention to all architec-
tural scales, such as elements, volumes and material.28
In terms of the qualities of Scarpa’s designs, Richard Murphy observed
that Scarpa’s “artistry has always been universally acknowledged but his
working method, his budgets, his clients and his collaboration with crafts-
men were so unusual as to be condemned as irrelevant to the mainstream
of architectural endeavour”.29 Murphy’s observation is stated with con-
fidence in the “value” of Scarpa’s labours.30 However, others have inter-
preted Scarpa’s independence from the practices of his contemporaries as
rendering his work inconsequential.31 For instance, Manfredo Tafuri crit-
icises Scarpa, saying his “power lies in his creative use of low level tech-
nology, and, his own awareness of the disintegration of those economical
conditions that have allowed his subjective poetry”.32 Tafuri, like others
24 [Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, 257]
25 [Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, 257]
26 [Albertini, 1988, 7]
27 [Albertini, 1988, 7]
28 [Soroka, 1979, 3]
29 [Murphy, 1993, 18]
30 [Murphy, 1993, 19]
31 [Soroka, 1979, 2]
32 [Tafuri, 1975, -], quoted in [Soroka, 1979, 2]
70
at the time just prior to Scarpa’s death, found an insurmountable void be-
tween the “expressive, time consuming [and] luxurious” nature of Scarpa’s
works, and the conventions of architecture commonly practised during the
1970s.33 However, contrary to Tafuri’s assertion, Scarpa embraced the “ex-
tension” of the craftsman by employingmachines during the progression of
refining a material, albeit the preliminary stage of working with a material
and with the machine’s work being completed and refinished by hand.34
Hence, with the knowledge that Scarpa is unconventional, and to some de-
gree a controversial figure, I examine three of the volumes he created.
To repeat, each of the volumes considered demonstrates a combination
of the design solutions. Although, I limit myself to drawing out the rele-
vant qualities to explain the particular design solution afforded byMerleau-
Ponty’s research. My prior analysis led to understanding the body as exist-
ing in a spatial situation through a directed, knowing, purposeful, non-
rule-governed, and non-reflective flow of actions. That is, intentionally
bodily actions understand causal connections and respond to affordances.
The primary objective in designing for the thinking body is to design spaces
that are sympathetic to the intentional flow of bodily movement. Hence,
the architect can design spaces for the thinking body by providing spatial
affordances and veritable causal connection.
Designing for spatial affordances is a relatively established idea.35 Hence
I shall quickly walk through the concept and my variation of emphasising
the study of the style of embodied cultural skills and then move to the more
singular solution of designing for veritable causal connections.36
33 [Murphy, 1993, 19]
34 [Zambonini, 1983, 30]
35In the essay, A dialectics of Determination: Social Truth-Claims in Architectural Writing,
1970-1995, David J.T. Vanderburgh and W. Russell Ellis refer to the “the ‘pull’ of phe-
nomenology. . . ” as a well known notion in contemporary architectural writing. [Piotrowski
and Robinson, 2001, 122]
36See section 2.2.3 for discussion of styles of embodied cultural skills.
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5.2.1 Corridor
Figure 5.5: Carlo Scarpa, Castelvecchio Museum, Verona, 1964
Between 1957 and 1964 Carlo Scarpa and museum director Licisco Magag-
nato worked on the restoration of the Museo di Castelvecchio in Veneto.37
The corridor is one of the many spaces Scarpa created during the restora-
tion. It is a small stairwell leading to the upper walkways of the gallery
wing. The visitor arrives at the base of the stairwell either from a tunnel
connecting the second floor of the palace with the watchtower or from a
staircase descending past the “Cangrande Statue”.38 The stairwell is a dark
space, cave like, and constructed of concrete. The stairs are angled and jut
out to the user. A small platform hovers above the ground and is employed
as the first step. The steps engage themovement of the body. George Dodds
argues that in the design of the Castelvecchio Museum, Scarpa sought to
reverse the “mechanization of vision”, labelled the “ ‘Viewing body’ ” by
Jonathan Crary.39 Dodds further reasons that “Scarpa’s intention was. . . to
engage the sentient body through both the construction of views and the
37 [Cas, 2008, 1]
38 [Crippa, 1986, 300]
39 [Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, 242] Found in endnote 20. Details in endnotes [360].
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Figure 5.6: Carlo Scarpa, Hand drawing, Castelvecchio Museum, Verona,
1964
manipulation of the body of the viewer.”40 In this way Scarpa’s spatial
practices are about how the arrangement of space can cater to the thinking
body. Hence for the stairwell, as well as concrete steps, it is the experi-
ence of narrowing spaces or opening spaces, about rising spaces and falling
spaces created by the protruding steps and the angled steps. The juxtaposi-
tion of horizontal and vertical planes powerfully reinforces the distinction
between the two styles of step.
40 [Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, 360] found in Footnote 20.
73
Figure 5.7: Marcel Duchamp, Nude descending a Straircase II, 1911-12
Architectural theorist, Neil Leach, discusses the experience of ascend-
ing a stairwell as a “mundane action”. In Leach’s recent (2006) book titled
Camouflage, he argues for an assimilating characteristic inherent to human
engagement with space.41 Although, this focus is different from Merleau-
Ponty’s, it still echo’s the theory of bodily intentionality. Leach proposes a
“psychic equilibrium” of the individual that engages with the experiential
world.42 Leach points to the “way in which we climb a staircase. . . ” and
claims it “can be absorbed into our familiar world”.43 The Castelvecchio
Museum offers the visitor painting, sculptures, vistas and grand rooms.44
The stairwell plays a minor role in the overall experience of the museum.
However, through the design of the angular planes, the steepness of the
grade and the narrowness of the passage, the visitor is pulled through the
space. Scarpa creates spatial form that avoids interrupting the flow of non-
reflective engagement with a spatial situation. One means he did this was
to design spatial affordances. Image of the stairwell from above:
41 [Leach, 2006, 7]
42 [Leach, 2006, 7]
43 [Leach, 2006, 7]
44 [Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, 242]
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Figure 5.8: Carlo Scarpa, Bridge handrail details, Castelvecchio Museum,
Verona, 1964
spatial affordances
In 1959, Steen Eiler Rasmussen discussed the phenomenon of spatial af-
fordance as leading an individual through space.45 Designing for affor-
dance can be as mundane as a how-to manual. In William Lidwell’s recent
book: Universal Principles of Design: 100 Ways to Enhance Usability, Influence
Perception, Increase Appeal, Make Better Design Decisions, and Teach Through
Design, Lidwell matter-of-factly explains that accounting for affordances
improves design: “When the affordance of an object or environment corre-
sponds with its intended function, the design will perform more efficiently
and will be easier to use.”46 Tangentially, Lidwell’s use of “affordance”
and “intention” exemplifies Vittorio Gregotti argument that the memory
of philosophers’ contributions lingers in architect’s minds while the philo-
45Rasmussen writes, “observe how you are naturally led from one [room] to the other”.
[Rasmussen, 1959, 33] In this case, something about the thresholds between the rooms af-
fords the bodies entrance.
46 [William Lidwell, 2003, 20] Lidwell gives further clarification: “for example, a door
with a handle affords pulling. Sometimes, doors with handles are designed to open only
by pushing—the affordance of the handle conflicts with the door’s function. Replace the
handle with a flat plate, and it now affords pushing—the affordance of the flat plate corre-
sponds to the way in which the door can be used. The design is improved”.
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sophical details are forgotten.47 The central idea is that certain aspects of
spatial situations, e.g. openings, seats, handles beckon particular responses
by the human body. That is, the door handle affords the hand to pull, while
the flat plate on a door affords pushing. In chapter two I established that
architects could adjust their perspective by further study of how things
appear to individuals and what things show up as affording; i.e., styles of
embodied cultural skill. In this sense, I have argued for a more detailed no-
tion of embodiment. This richer understanding of embodiment leads to a
change in perspective that effects how the designer understands the inten-
tional bodily flow, and thus how to design for that flow.
Additionally, in chapter three, I argued that implicit to Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology is the metaphysical understanding of an object as inde-
terminate without human engagement. To an individual approaching the
Castelvecchio Museum stairwell, the exact qualities that Scarpa set out
to convey will differ from one individual to another. The angular steps,
the smooth surfaces and roughly coloured concrete will attract some users
and discourage others. Scarpa’s spatial practices are deeply embedded in
the traditions of Veneto region.48 Likewise, his designs and constructions
emerged alongside local craftsmen and artist.49 The narrowness and hard-
ness of the space echoes the traditions, culture and attraction of the Veneto
region.50 The success of the Scarpa design is partly due to his understand-
ing of spatial affordances and his lifelong study of the styles of embodied
cultural skills.51 In general, an architect gains a more detailed understand-
ing of designing spatial affordances by a change in perspective of how the
designer understands embodiment.
47 [Gregotti, 1996, 95]
48 [Hawkes, 2008, 111]
49 [Zambonini, 1983, 15]
50 [Hawkes, 2008, 111]
51See section 2.2.3.
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5.2.2 Interior room: windows and light
Figure 5.9: Carlo Scarpa, “The High Gallery”, Museo Canovian, Possagno,
1957
Between 1955 and 1957 Scarpa designed an addition to the Museo Cano-
vian, Possagno. Among the rooms added is a room outlined by three walls
and a shallow step, called the “high gallery”.52 The gallery exhibits four
floor sculptures and a few smaller, wall-mounted sculptures. With regard
to the thinking body, the significance of this volume resides in the organisa-
tion of day light andmoon light. Set in each corner of the room are volumes
of light. Judith Carmel-Arthur describes the atmosphere that the skylights
enable as:
Seductive plays of shadow across solid form. . . diffuse light illuminates
the highly plastic values of the modelling, and profiles are relieved
against gradations of light drifting across the background surface of
the room.53
One pair of skylights is tucked above the ceiling of the approaching thresh-
old. The other pair significantly impacts the experience of the space as the
gallery is approached.
52 [Judith Carmel-Arthur, 2002, 30]
53 [Judith Carmel-Arthur, 2002, 15]
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Figure 5.10: Carlo Scarpa, “The High Gallery”, Museo Canovian, Possagno,
1957
The corner windows are above the body’s height. They serve less as
a means of seeing the outside world, as a way of translating the quality
of light that the outside world offers to the visitor.54 “At Possagno, ma-
nipulation of glass by Scarpa was always an emphatic gesture. Glass is
present in a selection of sub-narratives”.55 In this sense, the intentional
bodily engagement with the world is allowed to flow without interruption
as an individual enters the space. The corner windows are volumes of light,
not windows in the common looking-through or picture-framing sense.56
Boris Podrecca describes the distinction between Scarpa’s corner windows
and conventional windows as:
Scarpa’s invention of the trihedral corner windows, simultaneously
window and rooflight, that illuminate the ‘high hall’ is, environmen-
tally and tectonically, the most remarkable element of the building.. . . Their
configuration admits light from all orientations and, unlike a conven-
tional window set within a wall, casts light across the walls them-
selves.57
54 [Judith Carmel-Arthur, 2002, 15]
55 [Judith Carmel-Arthur, 2002, 15]
56 [Albertini, 1988, 213]
57 [Hawkes, 2008, 115]
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The skylights serve as gauges of the world outside, and connect the space
to the time of year, day, and particularity of the weather pattern. This is
consistent with the thinking body by illuminating the room through the
external world, and proving a correspondence for the individual’s flow.58
Figure 5.11: Carlo Scarpa, “The High Gallery”, Museo Canovian, Possagno,
1957
The quality of light offers a consistency between what is expected and
what is found. Should I walk into the space from the day outside, the qual-
ity of light echoes the larger environment. The consideration given to this
element of the space, is supported with Scarpa’s telling assertion, “I real
love daylight”.59 Engaging with the sculptors in the high gallery is an ex-
periencemediated by day light. My experience of the low light of awinter’s
day is not disturbed by a contrived and artificially lit gallery. Likewise, my
experience of the sculptures and my body’s engagement with the spatial
situation may focus on the art works rather that being distracted by a non-
causally connected quality of light at odds with the external world.
58 [Hawkes, 2008, 113]
59Scarpa, quoted in [Hawkes, 2008, 113]. Originally from a recording of a lecture given
on 13 January 1976, published in [Scarpa, 1981, -].
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veritable causal connections
The translation of the quality of light from the larger world to the interior
space of the high gallery provides a veritable causal connection for the body
that enters the space. The design solution suggests it is possible to create
a consistency when accounting for various embodied engagements with a
material or space. Both the light of Scarpa’s high gallery at the Museo di
Canoviano, and the materiality of the entrance bridge of the Querini Stam-
palia Foundation (as I shall next explain) demonstrate the traits of veritable
causal connections. I have chosen to label this contextual design solution to
identify a distinct phenomenon. Due to the disputed quality of the terms to
adequately explain the notion of veritable causal connection I provide a brief
survey of three philosophers’ definitions of the notion of causal connection.
An influential definition of causal connection is composed by the Mod-
ern philosopher Immanuel Kant.60 To establish a causal connection, there
must be at least two distinct aspects (aspect reading as, a thing, event or
idea) and a directional effect from at least one aspect to the other.61 I use
the term ‘thing’ to indicate an event, object, mental state, bodily state or
individual human. In line with Kant’s “Verknu¨pfung” or the causal connec-
tions within art, I define causal connection as the link between two things,
in which at least one thing effects the other’s existence.63 For example, the
water-saturated sash-window effects the stance in which I position myself
in order to heave its expanded girth as I open the window.
Furthermore, I employ the term veritable to mean that the experiences of
a thing correspond consistently throughout different interaction with that
thing. In other words, a thing is veritable if, and only if, all the different
perspectives of the thing match up. I find veritable to be a more useful
60 [Nell et al., 2004, 264] and [Watkins, 2005, 101] for the influence of Kant’s definition
of causality. Additionally for the general influences of Kant’s theory see [Edwards, 2000,
xii], [Wood, 2005, 1], [Ross and McWalter, 2005, x]
61
A causal connection, as our mere understanding thinks it, is one that always consti-
tutes a descending series (of causes and effects): the things that are the effects, and
that hence presuppose others as their causes, cannot themselves in turn be causes of
these others. This kind of causal connection is called that of efficient causes (nexus
effectivus). But we can also conceive of a causal connection [Verbindung] in terms
of a concept of reason (the concept of purposes). Such a connection, considered as a
series, would carry with it dependence both as it ascends and as it descends: here we
could call a thing the effect of something and still be entitled to call it, as the series
ascends, the cause of that something as well. This causal connection [Verknu¨pfung]
is easily found in the practical sphere, namely, in art.62
[Kant, 1987, 251], [Chalmers, 1997, 86, 193] and [Magee, 1997, 29]
63 [Kant, 1987, 251]
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term than authentic or genuine, because the truth quality is relevant to the
thing or the experience of the thing, rather than to an objective reality.64 A
dictionary notes the particularity of the term as, “veritable implies corre-
spondence with the truth but not necessarily a literal or strict correspon-
dence with reality”.65 Thus I define veritable causal connections as causal
connections, that correspond through varying encounters. In other words,
the affordance and materiality of a given spatial situation is dependably
effected by the human engagement with the situation.
Asserting that the designed space must have veritable causal connec-
tions postulates a working bodily synthesis of the different aspects of a
material object and assumes a temporal stretch. It also accounts for the
bodily synthesised objects that reach and populate the mind. Though these
measures, this idea differs from Pallasmaa’s design principle of working
with all the senses.66 Here, the aim is for a cohesive reliability of a material
object that affords a correlated experience of the object from different en-
gagements with the object. I.e., if a user approaches what looks like an oak
door, the process of opening the door and moving through the door, and
all other uses associated with the door and how the door relates to the rest
of the door, should correspond to the materiality of the door.
Figure 5.12: Working hand drawing.
64Objective reality, as a system of order unaffected by perception. “B. n. 1. A thing or
class of things external to or independent of the mind; an object of conscious thought; that
which is objective (sense A. 3b)” [OED, 2008, objective, 2b1]
65 [Apple, 2007, -] Also note, “3. In extended use, denoting possession of all the distinctive
qualities of the person or thing specified”. [OED, 2008, veritable,3]
66As discussed in the previous chapter.
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The light of Scarpa’s high gallery welcomes the user into the room as it
resonates with the user’s previous experience of the day outside. Respond-
ing to the space of the gallery does not necessarily involve an observation of
the reflective intellect. The body can engage with the space uninterrupted
as the verifiability of the causal connection is satisfied. For the thinking
body to have veritable causal connections, the first thing needed is a re-
lationship between the embodied intentional flow and a spatial situation.
The spatial situation is composed of affordances and materiality. As the
embodied intentional flow causes changes to the spatial situation, those
changes are consistent throughout the period of engagement. This under-
standing of the arrangement between body and space affords the idea that
the thinking body can anticipate the effects of its actions with some accu-
racy. Architects can provide this accuracy by the veritable quality of thema-
terials used in the built space, of which Scarpa’s volume of light illustrates.
To further demonstrate the implications of this design solution founded on
Merleau-Ponty’s implicit understanding of human experience I now turn
to a description of the entrance of the Scarpa’s Querini Stampalia Foun-
dation. In analysing the qualities of the Scarpa’s architectural volume, I
discuss a means of designing for veritable causal connections by avoiding
object fac¸adism.
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5.2.3 Entrance
Figure 5.13: Carlo Scarpa, View of entrance bridge seen from above, Fon-
dazione Querini Stampalia, Venice, 1961-1963
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Figure 5.14: Carlo Scarpa, View of entrance bridge seen from calle, Fon-
dazione Querini Stampalia, Venice, 1961-1963
In 1959 Carlo Scarpa began to rework the ground floor of a “shell” of a 16th-
century Venetian villa with the director of the Querini Stampalia Founda-
tion, Giuseppe Mazzariol.67 The ground floor of the villa is used as an art
exhibition space for the Foundation. Scarpa’s first concern was establishing
a new entrance to the villa across the canal. The bridge employs a combi-
nation of materials. The materials are carefully fitted with each other, and
no material obscures the others.
As a person approaches the bridge, the first two steps of stone work can
be taken as lifting out of the ground’s pavement. The common pavers of
the walkways and piazze, meet the pair of large stone steps which prepare
for the wood and steel bridge. The steel of the handrails, positioned in
the stone, join the elements of teak and brass. The oak steps are raised
apart from the steel vault by steel brackets on either side, the steps are
slightly angled from the horizontal in the traditional manner.68 This is no
balustrade, instead, two steel handrails are provided.69 Richard Murphy
describes the materiality of the bridge as:
67 [Murphy, 1993, 8,2, 7] Respectively citing dates, shell, and director. Giuseppe Mazzar-
iol was also a lifelong friend of Scarpa, and later collaborated on the design of the Brion
sanctuary. [Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, 240]
68 [Murphy, 1993, 9]
69 [Murphy, 1993, 9]
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The connection to a single bar which supports a tubular steel rail is
a characteristic Scarpa intensification of both the process of jointing
and an acknowledgement of the change of scale from the structure of
handrail upright to the more delicate tactile scale of the rail itself.70
Elements such as Scarpa’s “intensification” of the junction of materi-
als and change of scale compose an overall space that invites the think-
ing body to confidently approach.71 The body’s initial assumptions of the
material’s response to the body’s engagement are confirmed as the body
further scrutiny the bridge through use.
Figure 5.15: Carlo Scarpa, Bridge handrail details, Fondazione Querini Stam-
palia, Venice, 1961-1963
object fac¸adism
Architects can creates spaces that aim to avoid interrupting the flow of non-
reflective engagement with a spatial situation by avoiding object fac¸adism.
I created the term, object fac¸adism, to examine the implications for mate-
riality implicated by the concept of veritable causal connections. I define
70 [Murphy, 1993, 9]
71 [Murphy, 1993, 9]
85
object fac¸adism as the design and creation of objects that present a false
veil to the user, such that the user is unprepared to engage with the under-
lying object. In other words, materials that pretend to be something other
than what they are. Along these lines, Carlo Scarpa says that architects
should acknowledge the “true nature” of the material.72 To avoid object
fac¸adism means avoiding veneer, paint, “gib-board” or “sheet-rock”, clear
glass looking windows, and artificial light when it could be provided by
sun or moon. Likewise, it advocates the use of whole materials, such as
concrete, metal, wood, cloth, stone, etc.
Figure 5.16: Carlo Scarpa, Bridge handrail details, Fondazione Querini Stam-
palia, Venice, 1961-1963
The following thought experiment is designed to explain why object
fac¸adism disrupts the intentional flow of bodily engagement with a spatial
situation. For instance, consider the experience of entering a newmuseum,
across a bridge. Let us imagine two situation in which you have to cross
a footbridge. In the first case you come to Scarpa’s bridge for the Palazzo
Querini Stampalia. You identify the bridge from the opposite side of the
piazze, and weave through the tourist feeding pigeon.73 As you walk, you
72 [Murphy, 1993, 9] “in every project Scarpawas anxious that the true nature of amaterial
— tectonic or molithic, planar or solid — should always be acknowledged”. [Murphy, 1993,
9]
73This is a thought experiment, so forgive that while it is common for tourist to feed the
pigeon at Piazza S. Marco, it is not likely that this happens at the Palazzo Querini Stam-
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keep hold of your bags and keep track of your wallet, easing your way
through the extravagant hand gestures. Approaching the bridge you step
up onto the first two stone steps, admire the defiant blueness of the water,
questioning - ‘Don’t people always say the water is terribly polluted?’ and
find yourself entering an impressive collection of art. In the second sce-
nario, you are entering a museum, but rather than Scarpa’s bridge, there
is bridge designed by an enthusiastic contemporary designer. The bridge
is composed of glass railings and a vinyl sheet fastened to a thin plate of
steel. Again, you identify the bridge from across the piazze. As you make
you way to the bridge, again easing through the other tourist, you start to
eye up the bridge. ‘ How big are those steps?’, ‘How sturdy, high, slippery
is it?’ Maybe you glance about the piazze to see if anyone else is about to
cross the bridge, for comparison and to get some idea of what you are about
to walk on to. When you get to the bridge, you rearrange your shopping
bags, to have your hands free, and then step up onto the first step, feeling
for its weight and then cautiously guide yourself across the bridge, ready
for the unexpected, because the body does not know how the bridge will
be. The veneer of the steel and the clearness of the glass disturbed the non-
reflective intentional flow of engagement with the spatial situation. The
thinking body needs to syntheses the possibilities of the underlying steel
as it is hidden underneath the possibilities of the vinyl. Metaphysically, the
body must engage with both the thin layer of a cloud of possibilities and
the concealed cloud of possibilities.
Avoiding object fac¸adism is about how spatial situations are experienced
and accessed, as opposed to how spatial situations mechanically work. Ar-
chitectural honesty with regard to engineered aspects of a building is an an-
alytically reflective experience; i.e. revealing the plumbing of the building
engages analytical intentionality rather than bodily intentionality. Rekect-
ing object fac¸adism is about making the materiality of the building more
grasp-able, rather than exposing the bones of a building; such as the wires,
ducts or supporting structures. This is akin to notion that for the thinking
body, a richer means of engaging with another human being is not about
experiencing the other person’s arteries and veins.
5.3 Conclusion
Architectural theorist Neil Leach states: “not only do we grow into and be-
come part of our environment, but our environment becomes part of us”.74
palia’s piazze.
74 [Leach, 2006, 7]
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The environments created by Carlo Scarpa afford smooth transitions from
one engagement with a space to another. The stairwell, the light, and the
bridge each provide volumes affording the body an uninterrupted meta-
morphosis into the space. This is not a universally desirable design, how-
ever the volumes do cater to the thinking body. The contextual design so-
lutions relate to the implicit structure of human existence abstracted from
Merleau-Ponty’s work. The non-reflective synthesis of the independent
qualities is prioritised by the design solutions. The difference between a
collection of senses (as Pallasmaa puts forth) and the synthesis of aspects is
the need for reflection. The theory aligned with Merleau-Ponty’s proposes
that the act of synthesis is independent of reflection.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
My intent in writing this thesis was to share my enthusiasm for Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of how the human body engages with its surround-
ings.1 As I explored architectural theory I found a flaw as I read Juhani
Pallasmaa’s Eye of the Skin. In turn, as I discussed phenomenology with
architectural students, I observed that the unconventionality of Merleau-
Ponty’s theory was lost in translation.2 There is a richness offered in the
layers of description, the paragraphs that span pages, and the originality
of Merleau-Ponty’s conclusions. This work caught my attention and has
lived with me for the past decade. My aim here has been to translate the
flowery, poetical and often rambling ideas of Merleau-Ponty’s perspective
in as clear and logical fashion as possible.
In essence, I first outlined an argument forMerleau-Ponty’s phenomeno-
logical understanding of the human body’s experience of being in space,
and in the following chapter used my rendering of the thinking body to
critique the architectural theory of Juhani Pallasmaa. I then concluded by
responding to the question, what architectural practices cater to the thinking
body? In reply I analysed two theoretical accounts of experiencing space,
distinguish their structures and then integrated the theoretical accountwith
practical ideas for design practices.
In more detail, I launched into Merleau-Ponty’s account of the human
1As a child, I played the role of ‘amateur architect’: drawing house plans, sections, vis-
iting my older bother on construction job sites, and destroying my other brother’s architec-
tural models as he brought them home from university. Serendipity brought me to study
philosophy, but I have invariably gravitated towards architectural texts.
2I.e., lost in the various attempts to apply the theory into the world of architecture.
89
body’s capacity for thought, after a brief survey of architectural theorists
who critique contemporary architecture for lacking enough consideration
of the human body. My examination of the body’s capacity for thought
leads to understanding the thinking body as experiencing space via an in-
tentional flow of bodily movements. In other words, the body exists in a
spatial situation through a directed, knowing, purposeful, flow of actions.
This means that bodily actions both understand causal connections and
respond to spatial affordances. In chapter two the emphasis for design
centres on an individual’s perspective of the bodily manner of engaging
with space, hence further study of styles of embodied cultural skill could ad-
vance design catering to the thinking body. In brief summary, the chap-
ter describes how the readiness to respond to a situation and architectural
elements is housed in the body, and thereby a further study of how vari-
ous styles of embodiment perceive the elements as affording certain actions
could increase the consideration given to the body in designed spaces.
I examined five phases of learning new skills to demonstrate the human
body’s capacity for thought. In the final expert phase, as aspects of space be-
come present, the thinking body syntheses elements and responds to them
independently of the reflective capacities of the mind. This process creates
the uninterrupted flow of intentionality that is observable in people highly
developed of particular skills. The examination revealed various stages
by which the body interacts with space, which can translate to a number
of ways an individual engages with space and demonstrates elements en-
abling the body to learn.
In chapter three, theorising the metaphysical function of the thinking
body produced an acknowledgement that it is possible to shift the perspec-
tive, or mind-set, of an architect to state more compatible with the phenom-
ena of human spatial experience. The shift in perspective takes the archi-
tect from the dominant reductive notion of the human body, to one that
grants a bodily synthesis.3 In particular, the new perspective recognises
the body’s flow of intentionally engaging with independent things. This
is a flow in which the body synthesises possibilities of what-could-be into
what-is; i.e., a process that makes objects determinate for the span of time
that the body engages with the situation. Additionally, the new approach
accounts for the metaphysical limits of materials, as both open to numer-
ous interpretations and limited independently of human beings. Chapter
three, therefore, leads to a perspective change rather than directly to a de-
sign change. This change in perspective enables a designer to understand
the intentional bodily flow, and thus that there is the potential to design for
that flow. The analysis leads to understanding the thinking body as one
3 [Imrie, 2003, 58]
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which experiences space through a directed, knowing, purposeful, flow of
actions.
Although architectural theorists such as Juhani Pallasmaa and Steven
Holl, are aware that designing for vision alone is not enough, they miss the
innovation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Herbert Spiegelberg, a scholar
of Merleau-Ponty, discusses the general misuse of the word phenomenol-
ogy; “even now, the only protection for the at times all too fashionable
term [phenomenology] is its ponderousness and tongue-twisting ugliness.
But even this repellant has not been sufficient to make it foolproof against
misuse.”4 Pallasmaa’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the human experi-
ence of space are incompatible because of ‘where’ the synthesises of space
occurs. ‘Where’ is an awkward term to use here, but the distinction lies be-
tween the understanding of pre-reflective synthesis (bodily intentionality
of the thinking body) and a post-reflective synthesis (analytical intention-
ality of the mind). This contrast entails the degree to which an individual
person orchestrates her experience of space. In Merleau-Ponty’s account,
the individual has greater control over how materials, objects, and spatial
situations manifest themselves. He writes:
Hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, moonlight and
sunlight, present themselves in our recollection, not pre-eminently as
sensory contents, but as certain kinds of symbiosis, certain ways the
outside has of invading us and certain ways we have of meeting this
invasion, and memory here merely frees the framework of the percep-
tion from the place where it originates.5
By contrast the architectural focus of Pallasmaa’s human experience of space
is based on a collection of sensory experiences that the mind synthesises.
The importance of the difference between the accounts surfaces when ex-
amining the implications for design.
The architectural focus of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding is on clouds
of possibility that the body synthesis into spatial situations. Throughout
this thesis I have employed examples and thought experiments to illustrate
that engaging with spatial situations is not merely about multiple senses
absorbing material surfaces and then relaying those brute images to the
mind. Rather, it is my body’s act of, say, moving through a gallery hall,
pausing in front of a painting, adjusting my stance to get the best distance
to the painting, so that only then, do I ’findmyself’ admiring the painting’s,
4 [Spiegelberg and Schuhmann, 1981, 2]
5 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 317]
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i.e. reflecting on the painting’s beauty, symbolism, etc. That is, the theory of
the thinking body, presumes three things; that there is something indepen-
dent of human beings which influences but does not determine the objects
and spatial situations an individual engages with, that it is fundamentally
the body and not the mind that synthesise these independent things into
the determinate spatial situations we engage with, and that the readiness
to respond and interact with situations is housed in the body itself, rather
than in the mind.
In chapter five, I tease out a pair of contextual design solutions through
a study of the architectural practices of Carlo Scarpa. Elements of Scarpa’s
work are sympathetic to an individual’s flow of intentional bodily engage-
ment. Primarily, his use of materials and spatial composition afford veri-
table causal connections between an individual and the architectural vol-
umes inhabited. Secondly, spaces are designed to attract people to use the
space in a particular manner, i.e. designing for spatial affordances based on
a richer understanding of styles of cultural embodiment. Merleau-Ponty’s
position suggests that the architect shouldwork towards architectural spaces
and elements that are sympathetic to the thinking body. In particular, the
architect should be wary of inadvertently ‘tricking’ the body. That is, if
an architect is designing for the thinking body, then tricking the body is
counterproductive because it disturbs its intentional flow. Scarpa’s archi-
tectural practices provide for the thinking body by creating spaces that offer
the body the same information through a number of positions and engage-
ments with the materiality and affordance. This is a conditional claim; I am
not arguing that all architecture should blindly cater to the thinking body. I
acknowledge that there are cases for architecture that attempts to challenge
the inhabitant of the built space, but this is critical.
I believe that the element often lacking from the spaces contemporary
architecture are the non-reflective aspects of human movement and en-
gagement with space. The manner in which the body engages with its sur-
roundings by “opening a world” offers challenges and possibilities for the
artists of architecture.6
6 [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 297]
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